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ABSTRACT
By most accounts, the December 2012 Doha Round negotiations
achieved little. The continued failure of member governments to reach
consensus increases the risk of a catastrophic rise in global emissions.
The current impasse is due in no small measure to the expressed concern
of the United States that a climate change treaty will end up transferring
enormous wealth from the United States to China.
Analyzing the relevant market data, this Article concludes that there
is little or no evidence to support the notion that ratification of the Kyoto
Protocol will lead to the massive wealth transfers feared by the United
States. Indeed, the market study demonstrates the opposite. By
deconstructing the “China myth,” this Article achieves two tasks. First,
it rebuts the principal argument that U.S. policy-makers and the Senate
have offered to justify the United States’ refusal to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol. Second, in taking China out of the equation, it enables U.S.
climate justice theory to resume the arrested conversation about the
obligations of the United States, and other developed nations, to address
the problem of global emissions.
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INTRODUCTION
The Doha round of climate negotiations in December 2012 produced
little results, in no small measure because of the United States’ concerns.1
Despite the risk of incalculable harms and consequences to life and
livelihood posed by the rise of greenhouse gas emissions, the United States
is reluctant to sign an emissions accord.2 This is because the United States
contends that emissions trading will entail an enormous and unfair wealth
transfer from the United States to China, thus making what Professor Dan
1. See, e.g., Roger Harrabin, UN Climate Talks Extend Kyoto Protocol, Promise Compensation,
BBC NEWS (Dec. 8, 2012, 2:20 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-20653018;
Michael Jacobs, The Doha Climate Talks Were A Start, But 2015 Will Be The Moment of truth,
GUARDIAN, Dec. 10, 2012, at 19, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/dec/10/
doha-climate-talks-global-warming; Barbara Lewis & Alister Doyle, Despair After Climate Conference,
But
UN
Still
Offers
Hope,
REUTERS
(Dec.
9,
2012,
11:14
AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/09/climate-talks-process-idUSL5E8N7BQV20121209.
2. U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, THE EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2012 16 (2012), available
at http://www.unep.org/pdf/2012gapreport.pdf.
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Farber calls the “China argument.”3
In the scholarly literature, the case for and against the United States
ratifying the Kyoto Protocol4 is framed as a choice between justice theory
and moral theory. Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein are examples of justice
theorists in this area,5 contending that the United States is not obligated to
ratify the Kyoto Protocol under prevailing theories of justice because “[t]he
Kyoto Protocol imposed no obligations on China, now the biggest emitter
and placed heavy burdens on the United States.”6
Professor Dan Farber responds to Posner and Sunstein’s argument
from justice theory7 with an argument from moral theory.8 Farber forcibly
argues that the United States has a moral obligation to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol, because of its wealth and history of significant past and

3. Daniel A. Farber, Climate Justice and the China Fallacy, 15 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y 15, 16 (2009). For a classic exposition on justice theory and the China fear that dominates
American academic and political response on global greenhouse gas emissions, see generally Eric A.
Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L.J. 1565 (2008). Similarly, Jonathan
Wiener directly related U.S. climate policy to China. See, e.g., Jonathan Wiener, Climate Change
Policy and Policy Change in China, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1805, 1806 (2008) (“To solve the climate
change problem, the United States must act, and it must engage China.”). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Of
Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 9 (2007) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto]; Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China? The
Complex Climate Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas Emitters, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1675,
1676 (2008) [hereinafter Sunstein, The Complex Climate Incentives]; Cass R. Sunstein, Climate
Change: Lessons from Reagan, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2012, at SR4, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/11/opinion/sunday/climate-change-lessons-from-ronald-reagan.html
(“As in the case of the Montreal Protocol, an effective response to climate change requires many
nations to act. China is the biggest greenhouse gas emitter on the planet, and it must become a leader in
international negotiations . . . .”); Cass Sunstein, U.S. Should Act Unilaterally on Climate Change,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 23, 2013, 6:55PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-23/u-s-should-actunilaterally-on-climate-change.html (stating that those opposing U.S. participation in the Kyoto
Protocol emphasize “developing nations (above all China)” do not have binding commitments).
4. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec
10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol], available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
convkp/kpeng.pdf.
5. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1572. See also Farber, supra note 3, at 15; Daniel A.
Farber, The Case for Climate Compensation: Justice for Climate Change Victims in a Complex World,
2008 UTAH L. REV. 377, 378 (2008); Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzman, Essay, Climate Change and
U.S. Interests, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1532, 1534 (2009); Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto, supra note 3,
at 7; Sunstein, The Complex Climate Incentives, supra note 3, at 1677. For similar arguments in the
press see Elizabeth Rosenthal & Andrew W. Lehren, Profits on Carbon Credits Drive Output of a
Harmful Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2012, at A1.
6. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1600 (emphasis added). Even so, they believe America
should participate in the Kyoto Protocol, albeit for very different reasons. Id. at 1572.
7. See generally Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3.
8. Farber challenges Posner & Sunstein’s empirical and normative claims on corrective and
distributive justice. See generally Farber, supra note 5; Farber, supra note 3. For a brief summary of the
Posner & Sunstein vs. Farber debate, see Freeman & Guzman, supra note 5, at 1534, 1537.
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continuing high level of greenhouse gas contributions.9 This deontic
response, of course, fails to answer the essentially instrumentalist argument
that U.S. legal scholars and the U.S. government make regarding the Kyoto
Protocol.10
Both justice and moral theorists proceed on the presumption that if the
United States signs the Protocol, the economic consequences will be to
transfer wealth from the United States to China.11 To date, however, legal
scholars have not examined actual data to determine whether this
underlying assumption is rooted in fact. This Article is the first to examine
whether the evidence supports the presumption - will vast sums of U.S.
money drain into China, if the United States ratifies the Kyoto Protocol.
This Article introduces evidence that casts serious doubts on this
assumption.
The United States opposes the Kyoto Protocol because under the
existing regime, the United States and China occupy very different
positions and have dissimilar rights and obligations. On the one hand, if the
United States ratifies the Kyoto Protocol, as an industrialized nation, the
United States will become subject to legally binding emission reduction
targets, which the United States fears that it will be unable to meet. China
on the other hand, as a developing country, is encouraged, but not legally
required, to limit its greenhouse gas emissions.12 The Kyoto Protocol
allows countries to register and earn “carbon credits” for activities that
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.13 Nations can “sell” their surplus credits
to countries that have failed to meet their targets. China has no specific
target, and has earned the maximum number of credits to date.14 Therefore,
the United States fears that it will not be able to meet its target specified in
the Kyoto Protocol, and so, if it ratifies the Kyoto Protocol, it will be
compelled to purchase carbon credits from China, the largest supplier;
9. Farber, supra note 5, at 379–80; Farber, supra note 3, at 15.
10. See Wiener, supra note 3, at 1812–16 (arguing (a) in the context of global warming, nations
place limited value on moral arguments, and (b) appealing to the country’s gains at the national and
global levels would be a better strategy).
11. See Jacobs, supra note 1; Lewis & Doyle, supra note 1.
12. List of Non-Annex I Parties to the Convention, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/non_annex_i/items/2833.php (last visited Dec.
23, 2013). See also CDM Rulebook: Non Annex I, BAKER & MCKENZIE, http://cdmrulebook.org/973
(last visited Dec. 23, 2013).
13. This Article uses carbon market to refer to the market established by the Kyoto Protocol’s
Clean Development Mechanism rules. These credits are commonly known as “certified emission
reductions.” See infra Part II for detailed discussion on different types of markets and credits that can
be traded thereunder.
14. Historically, China has accounted for over fifty percent of the total carbon credit supply. For
details see infra Part II.
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resulting in enormous wealth transfer from the United States to China. As
Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein comment, “[I]ndeed, the cost to the United
States might have been as high as 80% of the total [expense of the Kyoto
Protocol].”15
This Article introduces empirical evidence that raises serious
questions on whether the Protocol will result in transferring U.S. wealth to
China, as previously assumed. The data suggests the “China argument”
may be a myth (the “China myth”). In Part I, this Article will provide a
brief background on the existing literature. Specifically, scholars have been
grappling with the question of U.S. participation in the Kyoto Protocol,
against the backdrop of the Protocol’s different treatment of the United
States and China. Neither justice theorists nor moral theorists have been
able to provide a cogent theory justifying U.S. participation in the Kyoto
Protocol, if China will receive vast sums of U.S. money, in the event the
United States participates in the Kyoto Protocol. In Part II, this Article will
describe the Kyoto Protocol, particularly, the market created thereunder
that has been a key source of the United States’ ire and objection to the
Protocol. This study will review the contracts and transactions
consummated in the existing carbon market (namely, the Clean
Development Mechanism established by the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change and Kyoto Protocol) to determine who
owns the carbon credits, and whether the United States will be required to
turn over vast sums to China under the present market regime.16 This
Article is the first effort to mine the Kyoto Protocol’s carbon marketplace
for evidence of the economic effect of carbon credit sales,17 and to that
15. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1611.
16. See Clean Development Mechanism, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/clean_development_mechanism/items/2718.php
(last
visited Dec. 23, 2013). See also United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9,
1992, U.N. Doc. FCCC/Informal/84 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. The UNFCCC has a long history and was
negotiated at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, held in Rio de Janeiro
between June 3–14, 1992.
17. See, e.g., NICHOLAS STERN, THE STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
(2006); WILLIAM NORDHAUS & JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD (2000); Robert Mendelsohn,
Ariel Dinar & Larry Williams, The Distributional Impact of Climate Change on Rich and Poor
Countries, 11 ENV’T & DEV’T ECON. 159 (2006). A sub-set of economists generally believes that the
United States will profit from global warming. See, e.g., Sunstein, The Complex Climate Incentives,
supra note 3. Freeman & Guzman strike a slightly different economic approach, stressing that the
current approaches underestimate the impact of climate change on the U.S. and the spill-over effects
from abroad, and arguing that overall the U.S. would not be a net-gainer. Freeman & Guzman, supra
note 5, at 1539–40. But Freeman & Guzman’s theorem requires the law to first accept and adopt a more
commodious notion of cost-benefit for climate change than usually accepted. The few Articles on
carbon credits have focused solely on country of origin, and not proceeded to examine the market. See,
e.g., Tyler McNish, Carbon Offsets are a Bridge Too Far in the Tradable Property Rights Revolution,
36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 387 (2012); James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the
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extent it joins the literature on environmental markets generally.18
Part III will analyze the empirical data and demonstrate that the
United States will lose little money to China through emissions trading.
The raw data essentially depict the lion’s share of China’s carbon credits
are presold to traders in advanced countries. Over 90 percent of Chinese
industrial initiatives that earned carbon credits have sold the credits to
principals in advanced countries.19 As a result, the United States does not
have to fear that if it enters the market as a buyer (because it is unable to
meet its emissions targets required by the Kyoto Protocol), it will be
compelled to purchase credits from China, transferring huge sums of
money to China.20 China has sold a vast majority of its stake to
corporations, a majority of which are based in Europe or Japan. These
corporations have executed forward purchase contracts and have bought
over ninety percent of China’s entire portfolio.21 China may own very few
credits (less than the 8 percent) that it originally received.22 As a result,
little to no future revenues arising from U.S. entry into the market will be
sent to Beijing.23 Similarly, if the market collapses as a result of U.S.

Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 628–29 (2000); Michael Wara,
Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism’s Performance and Potential, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1759
(2008); Rosenthal & Lehren, supra note 5.
18. There is extensive literature on environmental markets. See generally Bruce A. Ackerman &
Richard B. Stewart, Comment, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985); Daniel J.
Dudek & John Palmisano, Emissions Trading: Why is This Thoroughbred Hobbled?, 13 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 217 (1988); Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental
Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991); Howard Latin, Ideal Versus
Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory
Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (1985); Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U.
ILL. L. REV. 275 (2000); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice
in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677 (1999).
19. See infra Figure 6.
20. For estimates on the cost of signing the Kyoto Protocol see, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, It's Only
$300 Billion, WASH. POST, May 10, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/05/09/AR2006050901502.html. For other estimates see NICHOLAS LINACRE
ET AL., WORLD BANK, STATE AND TRENDS OF THE CARBON MARKET 2011 9 (2011), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCARBONFINANCE/Resources/StateAndTrend_LowRes.pdf
(estimating the United Nations’ carbon market at approximately $20 billion per year in primary and
secondary market transactions during 2009 and 2010); A. DENNY ELLERMAN, HENRY D. JACOBY &
ANNELÈNE DECAUX, WORLD BANK, THE EFFECTS ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES OF THE KYOTO
PROTOCOL
AND
CO2
EMISSIONS
TRADING
21–22
(1998),
available
at
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-2019 (assessing the cost at $38 billion, and
$35 billion (with trading)).
21. See infra Part III.B.
22. Id.
23. The outflow from the United States to Europe and Japan will be even lower because this
Article only analyzes data from “first sales” or the initial sale of credits from China, which is publicly
available. Subsequent sales are not included.
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refusal, China will remain unaffected (since it has already alienated its
credits) and any future market losses will be borne by buyers in other
countries. Thus, this Part will show the facts do not support the China
argument that prevents the United States from participating in the Kyoto
Protocol. After laying out the facts that debunk the China myth, Part IV
will remark on the theoretical implications of the empirical results, and
provide select observations on the future development of a normative
theory of climate justice. The concluding remarks will spotlight the
importance of factual and data analysis to legal scholarship.
Critics could argue, as they often do with empirical research that the
study engages in static projection and fails to consider the longer term
reaction of the system to the change.24 In this case, critics could contend What if China files for and earns new credits rapidly, as soon as the United
States ratifies the Protocol? Then, significant U.S. wealth will still flow
into China, undercutting the analysis here. This possibility may be set to
rest on the basis of facts. If the United States ratifies the Protocol, and is
looking for credits, it could easily buy on the secondary market (the huge
trove of China’s credits are now owned foreign or non-Chinese entities).25
According to the UNFCCC, it has issued over a billion credits from 2001 to
2012, exceeding U.S. targets indicated in the Kyoto Protocol.26 Moreover,
Chinese corporations must fulfill many international rules, receive
approvals from U.N. bodies and external, non-Chinese organizations before
receiving a credit and as a practical matter, they cannot earn credits and
flood the market so quickly.27 By showing that there is a significant group
of buyers, and stock of credits available outside of China to meet any
potential U.S. need in future years, this study provides policy-makers with
information relevant to the future; overcoming any potential objection that
the analysis is “static,” or the data and conclusion have no relevance for the
future. This, and other objections shall be addressed in detail in Part
III.B.4.’s Response to Possible Objections.
A general objection may be that this international treaty was not
created to benefit traders or strategic investors such as the World Bank and

24. Static projection or analysis or scoring means simplified analysis where the effect of an
immediate change to a system is calculated without respect to the longer-term response of the system to
that change. I am grateful to Professor Tom Merrill for raising this possibility.
25. See infra Part III.B.
26. See News Release: Kyoto Protocol's CDM Passes One Billionth Certified Emission Reduction
Milestone, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Sept. 7, 2012),
https://cdm.unfccc.int/CDMNews/issues/issues/I_P0QZOY6FWYYKFKOSAZ5GYH2250DRQK/view
newsitem.html.
27. For the procedures required before credits are awarded, see infra Part II.C.
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Goldman Sachs.28 This Article focuses on the question of whether the facts
corroborate the China argument, and so, the generic debate on the purpose
of the Protocol is beyond the scope of this Article.
In addition to contributing to the theoretical literature, this Article
assists American climate policy. This study does not intend to be a
comprehensive answer to the objection that China may gain a competitive
advantage over U.S. manufacturing industry. By exposing the China
argument as a myth, this survey eliminates the abiding thorn preventing
multiple administrations from ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. Even though
studies show market based solutions are a most efficient solution for
pollution hazards and would potentially save billions of dollars annually,29
the Senate opposes and blocks U.S. participation in the international
emissions treaty.30 Citing China, by unanimous vote, the Senate refused to
ratify the Kyoto Protocol in 1998.31 Such a vote was ironic, given then Vice
President Al Gore’s heavy involvement in designing the Protocol.32

28. See Rosenthal & Lehren, supra note 5 (observing the credits bought by Honeywell and
Goldman Sachs). This position is particularly noteworthy, because Rosenthal and Lehren are otherwise
critical of carbon credits. See also About the World Bank Carbon Finance Unit (CFU), WORLD BANK,
https://wbcarbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=About& (last visited Dec. 23, 2013) (“Unlike other
World Bank development products, the CFU does not lend or grant resources to projects, but rather
contracts to purchase emission reductions similar to a commercial transaction, paying for them annually
or periodically once they have been verified by a third party auditor.”). For the World Bank Carbon
Finance Unit’s portfolio, see Project Portfolio, WORLD BANK, http://wbcarbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?
Page=ProjPort&ItemID=24702 (last visited Dec. 23, 2013).
29. For a general discussion on market based pollution trading programs and the billions of
dollars they would save annually, see Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 18, at 1339; Bruce A. Ackerman
& Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171, 171 (1988); Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through
Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153, 156 (1988). For a discussion on the advantages of
the carbon trading platform specifically, see RICHARD B. STEWART & JONATHAN B. WIENER,
RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY: BEYOND KYOTO 11–16 (2003).
30. See, e.g., Senator Hagel’s comments on the Senate floor during the debate on ratifying the
Kyoto Protocol: “We are also interested in why the administration is advocating legally binding
emissions reductions for the United States and not for nearly 130 other countries, like China . . . . We
look forward to hearing from Under Secretary Wirth on this issue and the apparent inequalities inherent
in any such agreement. Related to this, we are also interested in how the administration intends to curb
the future growth of greenhouse gas emissions in countries like China, who would not be subject to the
same legally binding emissions, but whose emissions will soon eclipse our own.” S. Rep. No. 105-54, at
10 (1997).
31. The U.S. Senate, by a 95-0 vote, unanimously passed the Byrd–Hagel Resolution which states
that the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol that does not include binding targets and
timetables for China and other developing nations as well as industrialized nations, or “would result in
serious harm to the economy of the United States . . . .” S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (enacted).
32. During President Clinton’s term, Vice President Al Gore “symbolically signed” the Kyoto
Protocol on Nov. 12, 1997 even though it was never intended to be ratified by the United States
(because of the Byrd-Hagel Resolution). See Al Gore, Moving Beyond Kyoto, N.Y.TIMES, July 1, 2007,
at 413. Moreover, the United States originally advocated the use of tradable allowances, which Europe
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Because of the Senate’s position, at the international level the Obama
administration continues to insist that China’s legal caps are relevant and
tied to any U.S. participation in an international agreement.33
The U.S. Senate’s fear of China, or the China argument, has not only
prevented America from ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, but, according to
Energy Secretary Steven Chu, it has also hampered the passage of domestic
laws.34 Hence, though this Article primarily addresses U.S. opposition to
international regulation, it has insights useful for domestic regulation as
well.
This Article is timely: earlier this year, California established the
largest cap and trade scheme in the United States to date, a market which is
expected to generate more than a billion dollars in revenue annually.35
opposed. In the end, the United States repudiated trading and Europe embraced it. See David M.
Driesen, Sustainable Development and Market Liberalism’s Shotgun Wedding: Emissions Trading
Under the Kyoto Protocol, 83 IND. L.J. 21, 34 (2008); Sunstein, The Complex Climate Incentives, supra
note 3, at 1681.
33. In spite of calls by European and African nations to set stronger emission targets, President
Obama’s negotiators never acceded to the Kyoto Protocol. Senator John Kerry, the principal sponsor of
the Senate climate bill, stated “‘Having China at the table was the most critical thing because most of
our colleagues are saying, ‘Well what about China? What about China?’’” Darren Samuelsohn, Obama
Negotiates ‘Copenhagen Accord’ with Senate Climate Fight in Mind, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/12/21/21climatewire-obama-negotiates-copenhagen-accord-withsenat-6121.html?pagewanted=all (quoting then Senator John Kerry).
34. The Energy Secretary made these comments in the context of the Senate’s refusal to pass
President Obama’s proposed domestic cap and trade bill, S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2009), even though the
House passed it. Cap and Trade War: Team Obama Floats a Carbon Tariff, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 30,
2009, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123837276242467853.html (“But give Mr. Chu
credit for candor. He had previously told the New York Times that ‘The concern about cap and trade in
today’s economic climate is that a lot of money might flow to developing countries in a way that might
not be completely politically sellable.’”) (quoting Secretary of Energy Steven Chu); Elizabeth
Williamson, Obama Retreats from Goal of Cap-Trade Bill, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 3, 2010, 12:01 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704022804575041632860721438.html; Matt Negrin,
Whatever
Happened
to
Cap
and
Trade?,
ABC
NEWS
(July
17,
2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/environment-happened-cap-trade-globalwarming/story?id
=16790018. Fears are fanned on the costs of cap and trade. For example, estimates claim it will cost
American households an additional $1,761 per annum, more than double the average $900 annual tax
cut provided by President Obama under the American Recovery Act. Or, cumulatively, the costs are
estimated at $200 billion to $366 billion per year, or a 15 percent tax increase. See Declan McCullagh,
Obama Admin: Cap And Trade Could Cost Families $1,761 A Year, CBS (Sept. 15, 2009, 9:03
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504383_162-5314040-504383.html (citing the Treasury
Department estimates obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by the Competitive Enterprise
Unit); Tax Cuts for the Middle Class, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/taxes (last
visited Dec. 24, 2013) (“[A] typical [middle class] family making $50,000 a year has received tax cuts
totaling $3,600 . . . .”). California provides a notable exception to this federal trend and recently started
implementing a cap and trade scheme under AB 32. See infra note 35.
35. See California Global Warming Solutions Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 38501 (2006)
(Assembly Bill 32). See also Julie Cart, California Becomes First State to Adopt Cap-and-Trade
Program, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/21/local/la-me-cap-trade-
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President Obama announced that if the Senate does not pass a cap and trade
law, his Cabinet would take executive action during his State of the Union
address in 2013.36 The Obama Climate Action Plan announced in June,
directed the Environment Protection Agency (“EPA”) to issue regulations
governing power plants. This September, the EPA announced the first of
these, prescribing carbon pollution standards for new power plants.
Moreover, the Supreme Court will also be examining this issue - the
Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 15, 2013, in Utility Air
Regulatory Group. v. EPA, allowing six lawsuits to challenge the EPA’s
various greenhouse gas regulations.37 This decision comes close on the
heels of the D.C. Court of Appeals’ decision in Coalition for Responsible
Regulation v. EPA in June 201238 where the court reaffirmed the Federal
Government’s power to impose limits on emissions. This case law clearly
signals judicial intent to build on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in
Massachusetts v. EPA.39 Hence, the time is particularly ripe for the analysis
in this Article.
A final note before moving into Part I: this Article will, consistent
with academic and judicial positions, treat the following as established
stances. First, this Article will not seek to prove climate change or the
science behind it. In keeping with the decision in Coalition for Responsible
Regulation, the “extent to which these changes ‘can be attributed to humaninduced buildup of atmospheric greenhouse gases,’” shall be considered as

20111021; Felicity Barringer, A Grand Experiment to Rein in Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,
2012, at A23. A regional cap and trade system, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”) was
also adopted by 10 northeastern states with the goal of reducing emissions. See Robert N. Stavins, A
Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293,
302 (2008).
36. President Barack Obama State of the Union Speech, POLITICO (Feb. 12, 2013, 9:15 PM)
available at http://www.politico.com/story/2013/02/state-of-the-union-2013-president-barack-obamasspeechtranscript-text-87550.html.
37. Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted
sub nom., Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. EPA, 134 S.Ct 468 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2013) (No. 12-1146).
38. Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 133–34 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(holding that EPA regulations were rational and not arbitrary and requiring the permitting to be
extended to major emitters).
39. In Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007), the Supreme Court held that the
Environment Protection Agency (“EPA”) had jurisdiction to regulate greenhouse gas emissions
(because greenhouse gas emissions fell within the definition of “air pollutant” under the Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671g). The Supreme Court further remanded the case to the EPA, and ordered the
agency to review its contention that it had discretion to decide whether or not to regulate emissions. The
Court found the current rationale for not regulating to be inadequate and required the agency to
articulate a reasonable basis in order to avoid regulation. In Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc.,
684 F.3d 102 at 133–34, the court went a step further to state the law required the federal government to
limit emissions.
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well-established and no longer in question.40 Second, this Article will focus
on the market and forego digressing into the market versus carbon taxes or
regulation debates.41 This stand is supported by academics as well as
President Obama.42
I. THEORISTS’ ASSUMPTION
The scholarship supporting and opposing U.S. participation in the
Kyoto Protocol is divided along two lines: justice theory and moral theory.
Putting forward the classic justice theory position, Eric Posner and Cass
Sunstein posit, “The Kyoto Protocol imposed no obligations on China, now

40. Coal. for Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d 102 at 119 (citations omitted). See also id. at 122
(“In Massachusetts v. EPA the Supreme Court confirmed that EPA may make an endangerment finding
despite lingering scientific uncertainty. Indeed, the Court held that the existence of ‘some residual
uncertainty’ did not excuse EPA’s decision to decline to regulate greenhouse gases. Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. at 534, 127 S.Ct 1438. To avoid regulating emissions of greenhouse gases, EPA would
need to show ‘scientific uncertainty…so profound that it precludes EPA from making a reasoned
judgment as to whether greenhouse gases contribute to global warming.’ Id. Clearly, then, EPA may
issue an endangerment finding even while the scientific record still contains at least ‘some residual
uncertainty.’ Industry Petitioners have shown no more than that.”) After years of debate, this position is
also now generally accepted in legal scholarship and most articles proceed on the assumption that
climate science and the role of human activities is well-established. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 5, at
377; Freeman & Guzman, supra note 5, at 1532; Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1566–67.
41. There is voluminous literature debating the merits of tax or regulatory approaches in contrast
to market solutions. See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global
Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and Trade, 28
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2009) (generally arguing for carbon tax rather than cap and trade schemes); David
M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: Replacing the Command and
Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289 (1998); Richard Toshiyuki
Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air
Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 231 (1999) (criticizing cap and trade based upon the
specific experience with the Los Angeles Mobile Source Credits “(specifically, the Rule 1610 ‘car
scrapping’ program) and RECLAIM”).
42. See generally STEWART & WIENER, supra note 29; Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 18;
Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 29; Stewart, supra note 29; Stavins, supra note 35, at 296; Cass
R.Sunstein, Democratizing America Through Law, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 949 (1991) (acknowledging
a flexible option like a global emissions trading system is a central piece of any agreement to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions). See also Thomas Merrill & David M. Schizer, Energy Policy for an
Economic Downturn: A Proposed Petroleum Fuel Price Stabilization Plan, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 1
(2010) (“[I]n a recession the appropriate fiscal policy is to cut taxes, not to raise them.”). In fact, David
Schoenbrod and Richard Stewart criticize the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (or the
Waxman-Markey Bill) as excessively regulatory rather than providing an efficient market solution.
Moreover, they point to prior cap and trade successes, such as acid rain causing emissions. David
Schoenbrod & Richard Stewart, The Cap-and-Trade Bait and Switch, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 24, 2009,
12:42 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203609204574314312524495276.html.
Then Presidential candidate Barack Obama stated, “‘a cap-and-trade system is a smarter way of
controlling pollution’ than ‘top-down’ regulation.” Id. (quoting then Senator Barack Obama). See also
POLITICO, supra note 36.
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the biggest emitter, and placed heavy burdens on the United States. In this
light, the claim that American policy has been negligent, under prevailing
legal standards, is far-fetched.”43 Posner and Sunstein correctly recognize
the United States’ concern regarding the costs of reducing emissions,
stating, “reductions would likely impose especially large costs on the
United States . . . .”44 Next, without further investigation, they assume
“costs” means an outflow of U.S. money to other nations.45 They then
criticize this outflow from the United States as (a) crude means of
producing redistribution, or (b) problematic because it compels “many
people who have not acted wrongfully” to pay people who are not victims
of climate change.46 In short, Posner and Sunstein’s theory is based on the
assumption that money will flow out of the United States. This argument
implies that it is unfair for China to receive massive sums of U.S. money.47
Elsewhere, Sunstein also claims the Kyoto Protocol fails because of this
requirement that the United States ought to pay other countries (chiefly,
China).48 In contrast, Sunstein submits that the Montreal Protocol succeeds
because it did not unfairly insist on U.S. payments to other nations.49
In sum, Posner and Sunstein conclude justice theory does not support
payments from the United States to other nations (implicitly, China),50 and
so, this theory does not back U.S. participation in the Kyoto Protocol. This
fact is poignant because, far from opposing the United States’ involvement
in the climate accord, Posner and Sunstein believe, “an international
agreement to control greenhouse gases, with American participation, is
justified, and all things considered, the United States should probably
participate even if the domestic cost-benefit analysis does not clearly justify
such participation.”51
43. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1600. See also Farber, supra note 5, at 390 (critiquing the
logic in Posner & Sunstein’s argument as incorrectly conflating marginal harm with total harm); Jason
Scott Johnston, Climate Change Confusion and the Supreme Court: The Misguided Regulation of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 47–48 (2008).
44. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1565.
45. See, e.g., id. at 1565 (“On reasonable assumptions, redistribution from the United States to
poor people in poor nations would be highly desirable . . . . Many people who have not acted
wrongfully end up being forced to provide a remedy to many people who have not been victimized.”).
46. Id.
47. In the introduction to their article, Posner and Sunstein set up their theory against the
backdrop of China. See id. at 1567–68.
48. See Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto, supra note 3, at 60–61 (discussing the two Protocol’s
different treatment of the common yet differentiated responsibilities principle).
49. Id. at 47.
50. It is not only this author’s inference that they implicitly oppose payment to China. For
Farber’s characterization of the justice theorists’ position, see Farber, supra note 5, at 390.
51. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1572 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also id. at
1611–12 (“If the United States agrees to participate in a climate change agreement on terms that are not
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Dan Farber responds to Posner and Sunstein’s justice argument with a
moral argument. First, Farber pithily summarizes the justice theorists’
argument as follows: “[W]e only have a duty to reduce emissions or assist
victims of climate change if China reduces emissions . . . .”52 In short, if
China is not compelled to reduce its emissions, ipso facto, U.S.
responsibility for its emissions is dissolved.53
Next, Farber explains his moral response to Posner and Sunstein’s
justice theory:
China’s potential responsibility for climate change, however great,
would not erase our own responsibility, and because in fact our
emissions will continue to be harmful (and perhaps become even more
harmful) even if China’s emissions are unchecked. In short, the China
argument should be rejected as a fallacy in considering American climate
policy, and in particular should be seen as completely irrelevant to
whether we have a duty to finance adaptation by developing countries. It
goes without saying that China’s future emissions are critically important
to the U.S. and to the world – but our own conduct remains our own
responsibility.54

According to Farber: The United States has moral duties to (a)
“impose reasonable curbs on future emissions” and (b) “help other
countries, especially poorer countries, adapt to . . . climate change”—duties
that are independent and “not conditional on whether other countries—in
particular China—take action.”55 However, this deontic response fails to
quell the China alarm, a lacuna which Farber acknowledges. He notes that,
“[W]e also have to be realistic about the extent to which we can expect
moral considerations to influence policy, especially where large amounts of
money are involved.”56
Thus, justice and moral theorists’ position may be summarized as
follows: (a) Justice theorists maintain they would like the United States to
participate, but theory does not obligate the United States to join the

in the nation’s interest, but that help the world as a whole, there would be no reason to object . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
52. Farber, supra note 3, at 16.
53. The China excuse put forward is very similar to the carbon leakage claim that many scholars
raise. For instance, Posner and Sunstein point out that even if the United States aggressively pursues
emission reduction, it will not halt global temperature rise if no caps are placed on China’s emissions.
Similarly, it is argued, any effort at mitigation is futile because it will be overwhelmed by greenhouse
gases generated elsewhere – especially, because energy intensive industry would relocate to unregulated
jurisdictions (“leakage problem”). For a fuller explanation, see, for example, Freeman & Guzman,
supra note 5, at 1543. See also, Wiener, supra note 3, at 1807–08 (linking directly the China factor and
the leakage issue.).
54. Farber, supra note 3, at 19–20.
55. Id. at 15.
56. Farber, supra note 5, at 381.
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Protocol, because of China, (b) Moral theorists contend the United States is
responsible for its emissions, in spite of the China factor (conceding in
reality the United States will not ratify a legal solution that does not
similarly bind China).57 In short, both theories proceed on the presumption
of massive wealth transfer to China; without any investigation of whether
this China anxiety is indeed supported by evidence.
This Article, in contrast, examines the accuracy of this assumption and
asks whether market facts support the China myth. Part II will therefore
explain the provisions of the Protocol and the market it established that
gives rise to the China anxiety.
II. THE TREATY AND ITS MARKET
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(“UNFCCC”) is the single largest international treaty executed for the
purpose of stabilizing and preventing an increase in the greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere. The treaty aims to prevent greenhouse
gas concentration that would cause dangerous anthropogenic interference
with the climate system.58 The UNFCCC is legally non-binding since it
does not set any compulsory limits on greenhouse gas emissions for
individual nations nor does it contain any enforcement mechanism.59 The
Convention, however, establishes the following: (a) a framework to
negotiate specific treaties (or “Protocols”) that would set binding limits on
greenhouse gases, and (b) “a legislative-like body” (or the “Conference of
Parties” or “COP”) to meet annually for the purpose of implementing the
UNFCCC goals.60 In the 1997 annual meeting in Japan, the Conference of
Parties negotiated a legally binding document, the Kyoto Protocol.61 As
Professor Michael Wara notes, “To date, the most substantial effort to
57. Id.
58. See UNFCCC, supra note 16, at art. 2; see also Michael B. Gerrard, Introduction and
Overview, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 1, 17 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007) (“ [The
UNFCCC] was opened for signature at the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The United States Senate ratified it on October 7, 1992, and
President George H.W. Bush signed it less than a week later. It came into force in 1994 and now has
189 parties.”).
59. See UNFCCC, supra note 16; Kyle W. Danish, The International Regime, in GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 31, 33 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007).
60. See Danish, supra note 59, at 33.
61. Though the United States and then Vice President Al Gore played a central role in negotiating
the Kyoto Protocol, the Senate refused to ratify it. Hence, though Vice President Al Gore “symbolically
signed” the Protocol, it did not become a part of U.S. law. Thereafter, in March 2001, President George
W. Bush expressly repudiated it. See supra note 32 and accompanying text; Gerrard, supra note 58, at
19.
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address climate change is the Kyoto Protocol . . . . Although not ratified by
the United States and only recently by Australia, the Protocol was signed
and ratified by every other large developed country and entered into force
on February 16, 2005.”62
The main controversies surrounding the Kyoto Protocol arise from the
following three provisions: First, in order to reduce emissions to a level that
is “30 percent below what would have occurred under [a] ‘business as
usual’ scenario,” each country agreed to reduce its emissions by a
percentage below its 1990 emissions.63 The United States for instance
agreed to reduce its emissions to 7 percent below its 1990 emissions.64
Countries having different national targets, created a first set of
controversies, and aggravated the second problem presented by developed
and developing countries being subject to unalike obligations.
Second, furthering the “common but differentiated responsibilities”
principle originally expressed in the Convention, the Protocol puts
developed and developing countries in two different categories.65
Advanced economies have binding targets, while developing nations have
optional goals.66 The developing countries that signed the Convention are
called “Non-Annex I Countries” (“developing nations” or “developing
countries”).67 The United States objects to being included in Annex I of the
Convention (with the concomitant binding targets), because of the third
factor, the emissions market.68
Third, to provide countries with flexible options to meet their targets,
the Kyoto Protocol allows countries to: (a) document and receive credit for
the emissions they reduced, and (b) possibly trade any surplus credits.69 For
62. Wara, supra note 17, at 1760 (emphasis added).
63. See Gerrard, supra note 58, at 18. Though nations should typically agree to reduce emissions
below the 1990 emissions baseline, there are some notable exceptions. Some parties such as Australia,
Russia and others have not only negotiated no reductions, but even an increase in total caps. See Wara,
supra note 17, at 1767 n.38 (“These nations include Australia (108 percent), Iceland (110 percent), New
Zealand (100 percent), Norway (101 percent), Russia (100 percent), and Ukraine (100 percent).”). See
id. at 1766–77.
64. Gerrard, supra note 58, at 18.
65. Id. See generally Gore, supra note 32 (arguing that the principle of common yet differentiated
responsibilities is here to stay and is relevant to any future treaty).
66. See UNFCCC, supra note 16, art. 4, Annex I (describing the commitments to be given from
the countries in Annex I).
67. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at art.12.
68. See, e.g., Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto, supra note 3, at 6–7 (arguing that while he
believed a global emissions market would benefit the world at large, for the United States the costs of
the Kyoto Protocol and its emissions market would outweigh the benefits).
69. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at arts. 17, 6, 12. See also Aarthi S. Anand, Carbon Credit Not
A License to Pollute, NEW INDIAN EXPRESS, Mar. 4, 2010, at 11 (“Cap and trade mechanisms . . .
should be seen as a bridge . . . enabling industry and nations to move to green energy. . . . Countries are
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example, suppose the United Kingdom’s target is to reduce its emissions by
100 tonnes, and it succeeds in lowering its emissions by 110 tonnes. In that
case, the United Kingdom could sell the extra 10 tonnes to any other nation
that fails to achieve its target. Since developing nations do not have binding
commitments under Article 3 of the Protocol, they could potentially sell all
the permits they earned.70 This aspect shall be further examined in the
subsequent paragraphs.
The Kyoto Protocol provides two types of flexible mechanisms,
namely, the clean development mechanism (“CDM”)71 and the joint
implementation mechanism (“JI”).72 As shown in Figure 1 below, the CDM
and JI systems are designed along similar lines with one distinction—
whether the countries selling and buying the permits are developing or
advanced nations (i.e., listed as an Annex I or a Non-Annex I country).73

not compelled to purchase credits – rather the international treaty terms provide for emission reduction
targets. If nations cannot meet targets, trading mechanisms allow them to purchase these credits rather
than incur undefined penalties for default. Nations and industries would be unwilling to sign up for
legal commitments absent from a clear make-up mechanism. Credit trading offers a workable Plan B . .
. .”).
70. See Danish, supra note 59, at 46 (“Through the CDM, Annex I governments . . . can purchase
‘Certified Emission Reductions’ generated by emission reduction projects in non-Annex I countries.”).
See also Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at art. 3 (providing commitments only for Annex I countries).
71. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at art. 12.
72. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at art. 6 (“[A]ny Party included in Annex I may transfer to,
or acquire from, any other such Party emission reduction units resulting from projects aimed at reducing
anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks of greenhouse gases
in any sector of the economy . . . .”). See also Danish, supra note 59, at 44–46 (explaining Article 6
rules for joint implementation).
73. The differences between the platforms are over-simplified for the discussion in this Article.
International Emissions Trading (“IET”) is a third flexible mechanism available under the Protocol.
However, unlike the other two schemes, under IET each Annex I Party was allotted a fixed number of
allowable emissions over a five year commitment period. IET does not permit parties to earn additional
units (to sell them on the market). Plus, China is not an Annex I Party, and so cannot sell on this
platform. As a result, IET is largely unopposed by the United States and thus is not included in this
Article. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at art. 17, Annex I. See also Danish, supra note 59, at 42
(“The Article 17 trading system is very similar to the Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Program established
under Title IV of the [U.S.] Clean Air Act. Under each program, the regulated entities are required to
hold certain permits to cover their emissions. Under the Protocol, the regulated entities are national
governments, while the Title IV system regulates power plants. Under the Protocol, the permits are
AAUs [Assigned Amount Units]; the Title IV system uses ‘allowances.’ Each program allocates a
certain amount of permits to its regulated entities and allows the entities to trade them freely.”).
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FIGURE 1
Market Seller
Buyer
CDM
Developing country Industrialized nation
e.g. China
e.g. United Kingdom
(U.S., if it agrees)
JI
Industrialized nation Industrialized nation
In sum, the CDM platform is utilized when an industrialized nation (or
Annex I) buys permits from an upcoming economy (or Non-Annex I
country). As Figure 1 indicates, the JI market is used when both parties to
the sale are advanced countries. The United States mostly opposes the
CDM platform, hence, this Article will focus on this market specifically.
As explained earlier, for easy reading, this Article will use the term “carbon
market” to refer to the CDM and the deals in this market.74
In order to put the U.S. reaction to the carbon market in perspective,
the following aspects are worth mentioning. If the United States’ efforts
fall short and it is compelled to purchase make-up permits from the market,
the United States has the option to buy the credits from other advanced
nations. The carbon market transactions will only come into play if all the
following conditions are met: (a) the number of tonnes reduced by all the
domestic effort in the United States is added up, and (b) this sum, or the
total number of tonnes reduced by the entire U.S. domestic sector, is less
than the target set for the United States, then (c) the gap has to be bridged
through market purchases, and (d) the United States chooses to purchase
the credits from permits earned by China rather than from the United
Kingdom or the Netherlands.75 However, arithmetically, the United States
does have a valid point—since advanced countries have binding targets,
supply of excess permits from these nations may be less than the credits
from China.76
This brings us to the heart of U.S. objections to the Kyoto Protocol.
China, as a Non-Annex I country, can sell its permits, and the United States
fears that China will be the biggest beneficiary and recipient of U.S. money
if the United States signs the Kyoto Protocol.77 China accounts for more
74. “Carbon market” references in this Article explicitly exclude JI and IET.
75. See infra Parts III.A–B for list of countries that own a significant portfolio of credits.
76. For instance, China earned over 50 percent of the credits initially awarded, which is
substantially more than countries such as Vietnam or Malaysia that account for 2–3 percent of the total
carbon initiatives in the world. See infra Figures 4,5,6.
77. For example, legal scholarship has proceeded on the presumption that money will indeed flow
into China if the U.S. ratifies the Protocol. Moral theorists, like Farber, argue the United States should
still ratify the Protocol because it is morally responsible. Justice theorists, like Posner and Sunstein,
argue that justice theory does not require the United States to participate, so long as China will unfairly
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than 50 percent of the total permits that the United Nations has issued; a
fact that further increases the United States’ disquiet regarding the Kyoto
Protocol.78 The U.S. Senate summarized its objection as follows:
The Senate strongly believes that the [Kyoto Protocol] proposals under
negotiation, because of the disparity of treatment between Annex I
Parties and Developing Countries and the level of required emission
reductions, could result in serious harm to the United States economy,
including significant job loss, trade disadvantages, increased energy and
consumer costs.79

In order to parse out the U.S. objection, some carbon market context
and background would be helpful. Hence, the following Part A will discuss
the concept of a carbon credit, Part B will highlight the key features of the
market and the types of initiatives that received credit in the U.N. market,
and Part C will discuss the UNFCCC registry which provides a way to
track the ownership and transfer of credits.
A.

“Carbon Credit” – Concept and Background for the Study
In countries that have signed the Kyoto Protocol, the Executive Board
issues “certificates” or “credits” or “carbon credits” for every tonne of
greenhouse gas emissions that are reduced. 80 After the Executive Board

benefit at the expense of the United States. But the scholarship proceeds on the assumption that China
will gain the moneys the United States pays to purchase credits to make up for its high emissions. For
the Senate’s opposition to the Protocol and cap and trade, see discussions on S. Res. 98, 105th Cong.
(1997) (enacted), and the Energy Secretary’s comments on the Senate rejecting the cap and trade bill in
2010, supra note 34.
78. China accounts for 50.26 percent or 2,161 projects as on July 9, 2012. See infra Figure 4. See
also infra Figures 5 and 6 for updated statistics for the periods until Sep. 28, 2012, and Aug. 31, 2012,
respectively. Figures 5 and 6 show the Chinese grip is unlikely to be relinquished anytime in the near
future. However, it is also equally true (as shown in the Figures 4, 5, and 6), other developing countries
have earned 50 percent of the credits to date; India and Brazil, for example, own substantial portfolios.
Plausibly, the United States could purchase credits from these countries instead of China.
79. S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (enacted). See also Wara, supra note 17, at 1797–98
(criticizing the Protocol’s market; specifically, CDM for recognizing and awarding credits to projects
with questionable environmental benefits).
80. As discussed in Part I, this Article will confine itself to Certified Emission Reductions (CERs)
(or credits that were traded on the CDM platform) since these credits are the chief source of U.S.
resistance to the Kyoto Protocol. However, a number of non-U.N. or optional offset systems
(commonly known as “voluntary offsets”) also exist. Since the United States is not subject to
mandatory caps, the few American firms that buy credits opt to buy voluntary offsets (and utilize it for
marketing purposes). Companies buy CERs to meet mandatory targets under the Protocol, voluntary
offsets or credits in contrast are optional. NICHOLAS LINACRE, ET AL., supra note 20, at 9 (estimates the
CDM market accounts for 87 percent of the transactions from 2005–2010, which is valued at $26.5
billion, and voluntary offsets account for the remaining 13 percent or $4.1 billion in transactions.).
Moreover, voluntary offsets are issued and regulated by non-U.N or private bodies. As a practical
measure, industrial activities that (a) do not fulfill the United Nations’ rules or (b) are located in
countries that are not party to the Convention (such as Turkey) obtain voluntary credits. A number of
non-U.N. or private organizations issue voluntary credits (marking them as “Gold Standard,” etc.).
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and multiple bodies scrutinize the activity, the Executive Board issues these
carbon credit certificates. The predominant form of carbon credit
certificates are Certified Emission Reductions (“CERs”). In principle, the
Board provides one credit for every tonne of carbon dioxide reduced.81 Or,
1 CER = 1 credit = equivalent to 1 tonne of CO2 reduced.82 The onus is on
the party requesting the credit to prove that its initiatives fulfilled the
various standards and conditions outlined below. Since the Protocol sets
emission reduction targets for countries, countries that surpass or fall
behind the agreed number can trade these credits on the UNFCCC’s trading
platform; encouraging countries to increase their effort to curb rising
emissions.
In keeping with industry parlance, this Article shall refer to various
types of activities that are recognized by the Board and earning credits as
“projects” or “industry” or “industrial activities.” For readers’ ease, this
Article will focus on the industrial activities that earn credits and will draw
on illustrations from the industrial sector.83 Before turning to the UNFCCC
registry and carbon market process in Part C, it is important to briefly
acknowledge a possible criticism. Scholars point out that the market

81. The Kyoto Protocol covers not only carbon dioxide but also a “basket” of six greenhouse
gases – methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and
sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), in addition to carbon dioxide. See Danish, supra note 60, at 38 (“Each Annex
I party’s commitment applies on the basis of a ‘basket’ of six GHGs . . . The Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change has determined the global warming potential for each of these types of GHGs
relative to carbon dioxide. Adopting this approach, the Protocol expresses each party’s limit in the form
of a certain amount of ‘carbon dioxide equivalent’ tons of GHG emissions. In addition, for HFCs,
PFCs, and SF6, the Protocol allows the use of 1995 as a base year, which has the effect of easing the
stringency of requirements for these GHGs because, for most countries, emissions of those GHGs were
higher in 1995 than 1990.”); Wara, supra note 17, at 1766. For easy comparison, this Article will also
similarly utilize carbon dioxide as the relevant unit.
82. Fast Facts & Figures, UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/basic_facts_figures
/items/6246txt.php (last visited Dec. 26, 2013) (explaining the CO2 equivalent concept as follows:
“GHG emissions/removals can be expressed either in physical units (such as grams, tonnes, etc.) or in
terms of CO2 equivalent (grams CO2 equivalent, tonnes CO2 equivalent, etc.). The conversion factor
from physical units to CO2 equivalent is the Global Warming Potential (GWP) of the corresponding
GHG. If X Gg of CH4 is to be expressed in terms of CO2 equivalent, then it is multiplied by 21, which
is GWP of CH4 over 100 years timescale.”).
83. To date, industrial activities like renewable energy power plants and energy efficiency
improvements dominate the list. See Figure 2. For most recent trends in the technologies that were
registered until Jan. 31, 2012, see Trend of Types of Projects Registered and Registering, CDM
Insights, UNFCCC, http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Public/files/201301/regtypenum.pdf (last visited
Dec. 26, 2013). However, it must be noted, the Board recognizes and issues credits for activities in
different economic sectors, including transport afforestation though industrial activities currently earn
the maximum number of credits. See Figure 2. The industrial sector may be dominant because the
Protocol processes require the party to precisely estimate the carbon dioxide reduced by the activity and
it is arguably more difficult to measure the tonnes of carbon dioxide reduced by trees than it is from
metered power consuming factories.
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recognizes and issues certificates to activities that do not really reduce
emissions.84 In support, they point to hydrofluorocarbon (“HFC”) projects,
which earned credits even though HFC activities have dubious
environmental effects.85 But these critics ignore and fail to acknowledge
that while HFCs may have received some credits, renewable energy and
energy efficiency make up the lion’s share of the credits.86 According to
United Nations, renewable energy has consistently accounted for 60
percent of all carbon projects, and has risen to 80 percent more recently.87
This survey is based on market observations, so, any criticism that
certain type of projects, (such as HFCs discussed earlier) ought not to be
provided credits does not affect the conclusions here.88 Even if the criticism
on types of projects is accepted, and projects that in the critics’ opinion
ought not to have earned credits are eliminated, the percentage of credits
sold forward will not change dramatically. In sum, this Article is unaffected
by this potential criticism.

84. Wara, supra note 17, at 1797; Rosenthal & Lehren, supra note 5.
85. See, e.g., Wara, supra note 17, at 1779–80 (explaining that adipic acid and
chlorodifluoromethane industries, which have bad environmental impacts, have earned a large number
of credits). “The very large projects dominating the supply of CERs are confined primarily to two
relatively obscure industries—adipic acid and chlorodifluoromethane (HCFC-22) production. Adipic
acid is the feedstock for the production of nylon-66 and releases abundant N2O as a production
byproduct. HCFC-22 has two major applications. It is one of two major refrigerants that was phased in
to replace the CFC’s under the auspices of the Montreal Protocol to Protect on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer. HCFC-22 is also the primary feedstock in the production of PTFE, more commonly
known by its Dupont brand name, Teflon. HCFC- 22 production inevitably produces HFC-23 as an
unwanted byproduct. These two relatively small industries represent nearly 55 percent of the supply of
issued CERs in the CDM to date.” Id. at 1778–79. See generally Rosenthal & Lehren, supra note 5.
86. See infra Figure 2; UNEP Risø Centre, CDM Projects by Type, UNEP RISØ CDM/JI
PIPELINES DATABASE AND ANALYSIS, Feb.1, 2013.
87. See UNEP Risø CDM/JI Pipelines Analysis and Database: CDM Projects by Type, UNEP
RISØ CENTRE, http://www.cdmpipeline.org/cdm-projects-type.htm (last updated Dec. 1, 2013) (Number
(%) of CDM Projects In Each Category of Types).
88. See infra Parts III.B.2–3.
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FIGURE 2: Types of Activities89
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B. Powers of Attorney and Project Stages
The Protocol awards one credit for every tonne of carbon dioxide
reduced. Per the market rules, the party requesting the credits: (a)
completes a number of steps, and (b) submits a full set of documents.
Furthermore, the Board, national agencies, and independent technical
experts scrutinize the documents submitted. It is only after all these bodies
approve the project that the Board awards credits.90 While passing AB 32
creating its cap and trade scheme, California adopted similar procedures
including scrutiny by independent technical experts and multiple
organizations. Hence, the Protocol’s procedures are relevant to domestic
U.S. regulation too.91
Moreover, the Board has created an online Registry that discloses
various documents that parties file (describing the project, technology that
will be used, location, estimate of tonnes of emissions anticipated to be
reduced), the approvals, and the decisions received from the technical

89. See UNEP RISØ CENTRE, supra note 87. The data included in this graph adds up to 101.3
percent. Since this graph is extracted from the UN website, the author retained it without amendment.
90. See, e.g., Anand, supra note 69 (“CDM aims at high credibility through requiring approvals
from national governments, the UN and designated operational entities (DOEs). They are chosen for
technical expertise and of high standing, such as Deloitte’s TECO, DNV, etc, [sic] and provide final
checks, verifying and certifying reductions.”); Aarthi S. Anand, Will India Capitalise on Cancun
Gains?, NEW INDIAN EXPRESS, Jan. 28, 2011, at 11 (“The UNFCCC process provided for strong roles
for independent third party agencies, a singular achievement. Third party agencies (or Designated
Operational Entities) are involved at every stage, from initial verification, determining technology and
project eligibility to final approval prior to credit issuance.”).
91. See Cart, supra note 35.
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agencies.92 Parties also lodge the powers of attorney with regard to the
carbon credits at this Registry, providing a rich source of data to check who
owns these credits and whether the numbers support the China argument.
The following Part B will explain how the dataset was collated. Part
B.1. shall explain how the UNFCCC maintains a Registry that contains
powers of attorney forms, which enables us to track ownership and sale of
credits. Part B.2. will briefly explain the crediting cycle and various
milestones that must be achieved before a credit is issued—this context is
necessary to understand the analysis in Part III.
Part B.2. will provide one additional benefit—when describing the
crediting steps, it will highlight the documentary and approval mechanisms
that the Protocol establishes in order to ensure integrity in the market. This
is important because it addresses the main charge that critics levy against
carbon trading. Commentators often chastise the existing system, and raise
doubts on whether there are sufficient checks to verify the project details
provided by owners, or to assess and calculate the number of credits that
should be awarded.93 And so, this Part will shed light on the documents and
multiple tiers of permissions that the Protocol insists upon, which enhance
the transparency and integrity of the carbon markets – an aspect
underemphasized in current literature.94
Figure 3 below provides a bird’s eye-view of the crediting stages.
Phases (1) Registry and (4) Powers of Attorney are most relevant to
understand the analysis later in Part III, and so, Part B.1. will focus on
these phases. The following Part B.2. will examine the other project phases,
documents and agencies’ approvals; background pertinent to this Article.

92. For forms describing the project that must be completed in order to earn credits, see Rules and
Reference: CDM Forms, UNFCC, http://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/PDDs_Forms/index.html (last
visited Dec. 26, 2013).
93. See, e.g., Wara, supra note 17, at 1803 (pointing out that market participants often act
strategically to generate credits for activities that have no merit); Rosenthal & Lehren, supra note 5.
94. The Kyoto Protocol rules create various checks and processes to bolster integrity in the
carbon market, which formed the basis for an earlier talk. Aarthi S. Anand, Remarks at Transparency
International’s 14th Annual Anti-Corruption Conference: Getting Carbon Market Governance Right
from Day One (Nov. 12, 2010). A few experts disapprove of the complex system and the higher
transaction costs it creates. See, e.g., NICHOLAS LINACRE ET AL., supra note 20, at 41 (describing
disruption, bureaucracy, and controversy in carbon markets in 2010); McNish, supra note 17, at 391;
INT’L EMISSIONS TRADING ASS’N, STATE OF THE CDM 2009: REFORMING THE PRESENT AND
PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE 3–4 (2009), available at http://www.ieta.org/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=77%3Astate-of-the-cdm-2009&catid=27%3Aarchivedreports&Itemid=93.
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Registry.98 The Board accepts powers of attorney in a specific format.99
This form names: (a) the party with the right to transfer the credits (the
buyer), and (b) party authorized to communicate with regard to the
project.100 Since the first right or power to authorize the transfer of credits
is the most important power tied to title, this data-point is the principal
focus of this study.
Notably, this form can be filed very early. Experienced carbon traders
and buyers insist that sellers sign and deposit this form with the Registry.101
This power of attorney provides buyers signing a forward contract the most
legally secure mechanism to lock in the sellers.
Remarkably, this Article is the first initiative to comb through the
Registry and the legal instruments to track the sale of credits. The
following Part B.2. will include a brief synopsis of the crediting cycle to
provide context for the empirical analysis in Part III.
2. Project Phases. In the carbon project cycle, registration is the most
important milestone. In order to succeed in registering their projects (to
earn credits), owners must furnish documentary proof describing the
project, and justify on what basis they claim the activity will reduce
emissions, and provide clear figures to support their claim. Moreover, as
shall be described below, a number of national, UN bodies and third party
agencies must be convinced by the party’s claim before the project will be
registered. Because of the detailed scrutiny involved, conceivably, clearing

98. This form is called a Statement of the Modalities of Communication or simply, the Modalities
of Communication. For the latest sample form, see Modalities of Communication Form (Version 02.1),
CDM REGISTRY, UNFCCC (Mar. 16, 2012), available at http://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/P
DDs_Forms/Registration/reg_form19.pdf.
99. Id.
100. The three types of powers that can be granted to a third party are as follows:
“(a) Communicate in relation to requests for forwarding of CER
(b) Communicate in relation to requests for addition and/or voluntary withdrawal of project participants
and focal points, as well as changes to company names, legal status, contact details and specimen
signatures
(c) Communicate on all other project or programme related matters not covered by (a) or (b) above.” Id.
at 1..
101. Savvy traders include clauses to this effect in the purchase agreement, including as a
condition precedent for the contract. Telephone Interview with a member of senior management and the
negotiating team at one of the prominent international carbon trading firms (Feb. 05, 2013) [hereinafter
Interview with Carbon Trader]. See also E-mail Interview with Paul Curnow, Partner, Baker &
McKenzie (Feb. 18, 2013) (“Generally, (and this practice continues till date), Annex I Buyers
[developed countries] insist on being named as the focal point in the Modalities of Communication,
with the rights delegated from the seller (and any other project participants) to instruct the Board in
relation to the forwarding of credits from the project. Historically, Chinese sellers have been prepared to
give sole delegated authority, or full authority to instruct the Board with regard to issuing and
distributing the credits.”).
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this hurdle provides a good signal on whether the project will ultimately
earn credits.102 Though there is some flexibility on when parties need to
register their projects (either before or shortly after putting up the plant),
most parties choose to register early.103
First, the party seeking the credits must furnish detailed documentation.
The firm submits detailed documents substantiating its claim to receive
credits, including an estimate of the emissions that will be avoided.104 For
example, a corporation that constructs a 20-megawatt solar power project
will submit an estimate of the emissions that would result if a coal plant is
built to generate equivalent energy.105 The difference in emissions between
the potential coal plant and the actual solar plant built will be treated as the
project’s estimated emission reductions.106 The firm receives one credit for
every metric tonne of carbon dioxide emissions displaced.107 The party will
102. CDM Project Cycle, UNFCCC, http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/diagram.html (last visited Dec.
26, 2013). See United Nations Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the
Kyoto Protocol on its First Session, Montreal, Can., Nov. 28–Dec. 10, 2005, Action Taken by the
Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1., Addendum, Part II (Mar. 30, 2006). The party initiates the registration
process by submitting Project Design Documents and supporting documents to the third party entity
appointed for validation. A vast majority of projects that are deemed ineligible and rejected by the
Executive Board are refused at this stage. In short, this phase poses the biggest hurdle for a project to
secure credits. Interview with Carbon Trader, supra note 101.
103. Parties may apply before or shortly after construction. However, the Kyoto Protocol excludes
past projects or those already constructed. The additionality condition excludes prior projects. See
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, Art. 12 para. 5(c); What is Additionality?, CDM RULEBOOK, BAKER &
MCKENZIE, http://cdmrulebook.org/84 (last visited Dec. 26, 2013). Moreover, as carbon experts
confirm, “seeking early registration prior to construction was (and still is) the common market practice.
Indeed, emission reduction purchase agreements are typically structured on a conditional basis – with
explicit conditions precedent involving certain milestones being achieved before the credit sale and
purchase obligation becomes legally effective, or before any advance payment would be made. The
most significant milestone used is achieving registration. Several additional milestones spread out over
the validation and registration cycle (getting the Annex I and Host Country approval letters) give buyers
flexibility in being able to terminate and exit the agreement if projects were not ultimately successful in
obtaining registration.” Interview with Paul Curnow, supra note 101.
104. The party submits an estimate of the emissions reduced by the project. In order to estimate the
same, the party shows a scenario reasonably representing the anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions
that will occur in the absence of the project (“Baseline”). Utilizing this Baseline, the party calculates
and submits an estimate of the emissions that will be reduced by the project (“Baseline Study”).
105. For the purpose of this discussion, an over-simplified illustration (that omitted the complex
set of factors used by the Board) is provided. For an elaborate discussion on Baseline processes, see
McNish, supra note 17, at 404–05.
106. However, final certificates are issued after verifying the details of the actual plant built and
units of power consumed, an additional safeguard included by the market rules. See also infra note 142
and accompanying text (discussing Post-Registration Phases). Some scholars argue parties manipulated
the system by producing false baselines. See, e.g., Wara, supra note 17, at 1781–85. Since this Article
analyzes deals in the marketplace, and does not base any conclusion on the types of projects, any
criticism leveled against the types of projects do not affect this study. Moreover, the results of this
survey will show little change even if these criticized projects are excluded.
107. For readers’ ease, this example is evidently over-simplified. In practice, the Board’s decisions
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include a monitoring plan describing the procedures that will be undertaken
during the project’s lifetime.108 Second, the documents must be examined
and approved by the following three groups: (i) a technical organization
belonging to the select list maintained by the United Nations (“independent
technical firm or expert”)109 to validate the documents;110 (ii) local or
national government authorities who confirm that the party has complied
with and held a stakeholder consultation as per local norms; and (iii) even
after these approvals are obtained, the Board retains full discretion to
decide whether or not to register the project. In short, a project is registered
only after all these bodies decide that the proposed activity will result in
reducing emissions.111 Moreover, parties continue to monitor the project
and independent experts conduct final audits before the Board issues
credits.
Third, the activity has to be verified and certified. For the carbon
project’s lifetime, the industrial corporation collects data and continues to
monitor the project, as per the plan the Board approved at the time of

have created a body of rulings and precedent to calculate the tonnes of emissions displaced. This
general rule, however, suffices for the purpose of this Article.
108. This party adheres to the monitoring plan during the project lifetime, which will be verified.
For a discussion on the verification and certification phases, see infra note 142 and accompanying text.
109. The technical term for these agencies is “Designated Operational Entities.” These agencies
audit the project at two stages: (1) initial document scrutiny – a process called validation, which is
necessary for, and conducted prior to registration; and (2) final verification. This Article will generally
refer to them as “agencies.” Occasionally when the context so requires, these agencies shall be referred
to specifically, as “validation agencies” or “verification agencies.” Both validation and verification
agencies are drawn from the same list of accredited agencies maintained by the United Nations. Parties
have the option to hire different validation and verification agencies. List of DOEs, UNFCCC, http://
cdm.unfccc.int/DOE/list/index.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2013).
110. These agencies have the power to reject the project if, in the agency’s opinion, the project
fails to meet certain standards. This stage is called “validation” and is conducted as follows: (a) The
industry owner engages one of the agencies. (b) The owner then asks the agency to submit a request
(“validation report”) to the Board to register the project. (c) The agency possesses the power to decide
whether or not the project meets certain standards. (d) Optional initial verification - The industrial
corporation at its discretion, could also request the agency to in limine determine whether the project
fulfills the criteria required at later stages. Essentially, the agency determines whether the steps for final
verification (needed to issue credits) are in place. For instance, whether the monitoring plan approved
for data collection and management system is in place for successful verification and certification.
While this initial verification report is not conclusive, it provides early warning. Conceivably, this may
be in effect for the Chinese projects analyzed here. Carbon credit traders frequently develop the project
and also accept project risks. Hence, buyers often include a clause insisting on initial verification report
as a condition precedent in transaction documents; providing grounds to terminate the forward purchase
obligation, if the third party verification agency provides a negative finding. See generally THE GOLD
STANDARD, VALIDATION & VERIFICATION MANUAL FOR CDM PROJECTS (2006), available at
http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/GS-VVM-CER.pdf.
111. The Board accepts and registers the project (or requires revisions to the document) or rejects
it as ineligible for credits. If the Board approves a revised Project Design Document re-submitted by the
owner, the revised one is treated as the PDD for all accreditation purposes.
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registration.112 Once the power project is running, the industrial corporation
will hire an independent technical firm to verify the emissions reduced.113
The independent technical firms frequently conduct site visits to measure
the emissions reduced by the plant.114 The actual plant constructed
determines the number of credits that are receivable, and supersedes
estimates submitted at the time of registration.115 Upon receiving the
technical expert’s final verification and certification reports, the Board will
credit an equivalent number of credits into the owner’s account.116
Fourth, after the credits are issued, they are held in and bought and sold
through credit accounts established and maintained by the Board. When
credits are traded, they are essentially transferred from sellers’ to buyers’
accounts. Sellers lodge powers of attorney in favor of buyers, as earlier
discussed in Part I. The Board only accepts instructions to transfer credits
from entities named in the power of attorney forms deposited by sellers.
All powers of attorney are a matter of public record and available on
the Registry website. The following Part III will shed light on the
distribution of credits issued so far; particularly, Chinese entities earned a
112. This plan is called “Monitoring Plan.” The Board’s permission is required for the entire set of
registration documents including the Monitoring Plan (and any revisions to it). In practice, changes to
the approved plan are discouraged. The agency scrutinizes the project far more closely at the next stage,
when verifying the project, if the party amends the plan.
113. Regarding the method utilized to estimate the final number of credits, the following two
clarifications are important. One, the number of credits finally issued will depend upon the actual
project constructed (and not merely the estimate submitted at the time of registration). See illustration
discussed infra note 115. Two, the final number will be calculated as follows. The agency measures the
actual number of units of energy produced (by say, the solar power plant) (“a”). The agency then
utilizes the figures approved in the Baseline Study, i.e., the emissions that would have resulted if coal
power is utilized to produce equal units of energy (“b”). The difference between the above two numbers
will be utilized to calculate the number of credits: emissions reduced = b - a.
114. Also called “verification report” and “certification report,” respectively. See also Anand,
supra note 69 (“The annual emission reduction claim made by the owner will be verified by a
designated third-party prior to credit issuance.”).
115. Illustration: The firm may have planned to construct a 50-megawatt solar plant but finally
built a 20-megawatt plant. In that case, the party will earn credits for the 20-megawatt plant that is
finally constructed.
116. Parties (and the Executive Board) determine the frequency and timing when third-party
agencies are hired to verify and certify the credits, based on project size and economic considerations,
on a quarterly, semi-annual or annual basis. Industrial corporations often prefer to outsource the carbon
development work to carbon specialists (or traders). These traders engage agencies on a retainer basis
and so are able to quickly complete verification and obtain credits. Interview with Carbon Trader, supra
note 101. This business advantage may be criticized, but has hitherto not been noticed by scholars or the
general press. Moreover, as a carbon expert points out: “[v]erification and certification can only be
carried out on an ex-post-basis, i.e., the registered project must demonstrate it has achieved historical
emission reduction over a specific period. Earlier, it was expected verification and certification will be
carried out quarterly or bi-annually. However, due to the higher-than-expected costs and bottle-necks
due to the ongoing formulation of the verification rules, and shortage of qualified Designated
Operational Entities, today it is most common for projects to undertake verification every 12 months,
and in many cases, it only occurs every 18 months.” See id. (emphasis added).
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vast majority of these credits, which the data reveals they have sold to
European and Japanese corporations.
III. THE CHINA ARGUMENT – FACT OR MYTH?
The United States fears it will be compelled to purchase credits from
China, which possesses the largest store of credits, resulting in vast sums of
U.S. money being transferred to China.117 Motivated by the China
argument, the United States opposes the Kyoto Protocol.118 But, does the
United States’ China myth have any basis in fact? Or, is it the proverbial
Loch Ness monster?
This Article tests this hypothesis. The United States dreads entry into
the emission market because it believes China owns the vast majority of
credits—half the worldwide projects that generated these credits.119 This
empirical survey demonstrates that though China has generated a vast
number of credits, it has since alienated its stake. Indeed, China has already
sold and no longer owns nearly 90 percent or more of its portfolio.120 As a
result, the United States’ misgiving that it will be compelled to buy credits
from and transfer enormous wealth to China, is plainly incorrect.
Toward this end, Part A will provide a snapshot of the total global
projects and China’s projects (which account for 50 percent, or more than
2,000 projects).
Part B will form the bulk of the analysis, and examine all the Chinese
projects, without any exclusion or selection bias. Specifically, this study
will examine the powers of attorney forms for all the Chinese projects to
check how many credits does China truly own. Has China already sold
most of its credits to foreign buyers? The raw data essentially tells the story
– credits from nearly 90 percent of Chinese projects have been transferred
to entities in advanced countries.121 Moreover, for 4 percent of the projects
no power of attorney forms were filed with the Registry for us to
authoritatively determine whether these credits were sold early or not. And
so, the percentage of credits remaining in Chinese hands is marginal.122
Effectively, China no longer owns the credits. Thus, if the United States
joins the market and purchases credits on the secondary market, this money
will flow to London, Zurich, Amsterdam or Tokyo—not Beijing.123 At this

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See supra Introduction, Part I.A.
See S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (enacted); Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1600.
See supra Figure 3; infra Figure 4.
See infra Figure 7.
Id.
Id.
See also discussion in infra note 154.
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stage, a possible objection may have risen in the reader’s mind - If China’s
portfolio had been acquired by European and Japanese traders, does it
mean vast sums of cash will now flow from the United States to Europe
and Japan? This Article examines whether the China argument that is
impeding American support of the Kyoto Protocol is accurate. Whether
Europe will benefit from U.S. entry into the Protocol market is beyond the
confines of this Article. However, it is worth noticing that U.S. firms such
as Goldman Sachs and Honeywell, as also the D.C. based World Bank have
acquired significant carbon portfolios from China, Latin America,
suggesting net capital outflow from the United States may be less than
anticipated.124 Therefore, Part B will include a description of the
methodology used to collate the data, the results as well as answer potential
objections that may be raised regarding this study.
A. China’s Share of the Global Market
Per UNFCCC’s data released on July 9, 2012, over 4,300 projects have
been registered.125 Of these, as shown in Figure 4, China earned the biggest
share of credits initially awarded, accounting for fifty percent (or more
precisely, 50.25 percent or 2,161) of total global projects. India places a
distant second at twenty percent.126 For uniformity and accurate analysis,
this Article will analyze the same sample.

124. See sources cited supra note 28.
125. CDM Statistics, UNFCCC (Aug. 9, 2012), http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Registration/
NumOfRegisteredProjByHostPartiesPieChart.html. As per the most recent data released by the
UNFCCC, there are 7,400 projects registered, and China continues to be the leader. See Distribution of
Registered Projects by Host Parties, UNFCCC (Dec. 31, 2013), http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics
/Public/CDMinsights/index.html; Trends of Projects Registered and Being Registered by Host Party,
UNFCCC (Dec.31, 2013) http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Public/files/201312/reghpnum.pdf. In short,
these figure reinforce and do not detract from the analysis in this Article.
126. See Figure 6.
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FIGURE 4: Worldwide Projects - Data Released on July 9, 2012127
Total Number 4,300
Malaysia-102
Projects,
2.37%
Vietnam-131
Projects,
3.04%
Mexico-135
Projects,
3.13%
Brazil-198
Projects,
4.60%

Others-740
Projects,
17.20%
China-2161
Projects,
50.26%
India-833
Projects,
19.37%

Given that China has such a huge lead in the number of projects
registered to date, it is unlikely that this advantage could possibly be
diluted in a short time (or the period after July 2012). Yet it may be
contended that this study’s cut-off date skews the analysis because China’s
share is disproportionately high in this period (with other countries’ shares
increasing in subsequent months). If, however, China’s market share fell in
the period after the cut-off date, it could affect the conclusions. This is
easily disproved. Figure 5, which represents the UNFCCC data released on
September 28, 2012, demonstrates that there is only a negligible change in
China’s market-share in the period from July 9 to September 28, 2012.
Indeed, China’s share increased by .2 percent and no country’s share
changes by even a percentage point (as documented in Figures 4 and 5).

127.

UNFCCC, supra note 125.
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FIGURE 5: Worldwide Projects – Data Released on Sep. 28, 2012128
Total Number 4,690 (included an additional 390 projects registered
between July 9 to Sep. 28, 2012)
Malaysia,
2.35%
Vietnam,
3.07%
Mexico,
3.18%
Brazil, 4.54%

Others,
17.08%

China,
50.41%
India, 19.38%

This study also independently verified the UNFCCC’s numbers or
Figures 4 and 5. Not merely relying on the charts released by the Board,
this survey checked the full list of registered projects and confirmed the
number of projects hosted by various countries.129 In other words, all the
projects listed on the Registry’s website were scrutinized to vouch for the
number of projects registered by China (and other nations). Figure 6 was
prepared using projects registered until August 31, 2012 and supports the
finding that there is scarcely any change in China’s total market share.
This study further breaks down the country data to include nations that
contribute as little as 1 percent. A complete list of countries and the number
of projects each country has registered has been included in Figures 6A and
Appendix 1. In contrast, the Board’s data (Figures 4 and 5) identifies the
six nations earning the most credits, and combines all other nations under
the generic category “others.” A further analysis of whether smaller
countries also display sales pattern similar to China shall be left for future
work.

128.
129.

UNFCCC, supra note 125..
Special thanks to Jonathan Waisnor for diligently checking and profiling this data.
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FIGURE 6:
6 Projects Reegistered untill August 31, 22012
Total Number
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FIGURE 6A: Detailed Datta for Countriies Listed in F
Figure 6
(Total Numb
ber of Projectts – 4,908 as oof Aug. 31, 20012)
Perceentage Number
Proojects
*
Host Nation
Chinaa
49.499%
24229
India
19.644%
9644
Braziil
4.95%
%
2433
Mexiico
3.16%
%
1555
Rest of South Ameerica**
2.95%
%
1455

oof

130. This
T study includees the projects reg
gistered until and in
including Aug. 31 , 2012. At first glaance,
it may app
pear as though therre is a discrepancy
y between this totaal (4,908) and Figuure 5 (4,690 as on Sep.
28, 2012).. This may be easiily explained. Sep
p. 28, 2012 is not the cut-off date uused to create the chart
but is the date the Board reeleased the chart. As
A a result, Figurre 6 above includees a few more proojects
registered (registered until Aug.
A
31, 2012). Nothing
N
in the dataaset shows any m
mistakes in the Board’s
data (Figu
ure 5). Figure 6 is not
n intended to co
orrect the Board’s ddata as representeed in Figure 5. “Reest of
Europe” and
a “Rest of Oceaania,” contribute less than 1 perceent and so, the innformation is listeed as
number off projects rather thaan in percentage. See
S Figure 6.
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Vietnam
2.91%
143
Rest of Asia**
2.77%
136
Malaysia
2.44%
120
Rest of Africa**
2.04%
100
Rest of North and Central
America**
1.79%
88
Indonesia
1.69%
83
Thailand
1.65%
81
Republic of Korea
1.55%
76
Chile
1.26%
62
Philippines
1.24%
61
Rest of Europe**
0.29%
14
Rest of Oceania**
0.16%
8
** Percentage of the total number of projects, 4,908.
* See Appendix 1 for the complete list of countries combined together as
“Rest” of South America, Asia, Africa in Figure 6A.
The following Part B will study the documents registered in relation to
Chinese projects, which account for the majority of global projects. There
will be no internal selection—the entire China portfolio will be examined.
Specifically, the powers of attorney submitted for all 2,000+ Chinese
projects were checked, to determine the percentage of projects China
continues to own. If any other nation(s) buys and now owns a significant
portion of the credits that China initially earned, ipso facto, that country
(and not China) will receive U.S. money, if the U.S. accedes to the Kyoto
Protocol. Our analysis in the following Part B, thus, goes to the heart of
U.S. consternation and cold feet with regard to a binding emissions treaty.
B. Who Owns China’s Credits?
Globally, China has earned the most number of carbon credits initially
awarded as discussed in detail in Part A. However, an overwhelming
majority of Chinese projects owners sold their credits to corporations in
advanced nations. Corporations based outside China have acquired credits
from 90 percent of the Chinese projects; in fact, the Board’s records reveal
that most Chinese corporations transferred the credits very early on in their
project cycles, even before credits were issued.131 These advanced nation
131. See infra Figure 7. Note, power of attorney forms must be submitted to the Board only if the
Chinese owner sells the credits before they are generated or issued. In the case of China, as shown in
infra Figure 7, for a vast majority (close to 90 percent), the forms were filed by owners; ipso facto
demonstrating the credits were sold before the Registry issued certificates. For a discussion on owners
registering the carbon component of the project even before the main plant is constructed, and traders’
observations that Chinese owners sell their credits early, see supra Part II.C.2.
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buyers own title to these credits and if any subsequent sales occur,
payments will flow to these corporations and not into China. Similarly, if
as a result of the United States’ opposition to the Kyoto Protocol, the cap
and trade market loses steam, traders in the industrialized world rather than
Chinese industry will suffer loss.
Part B.1. will outline the methodology, and Part B.2. will explain the
results of this study. One possible criticism of the methodology and results
in Part B.2. could be that this study focuses solely on powers of attorney.
For instance, it may be pointed out, in addition to powers of attorney
holders, the Registry also records “project participants.” Project
participants are parties and nations that may have an ownership stake in the
credits, albeit in lesser quantities. On that basis, the following counterargument may arise: What if an analysis of project participants reveals
different results and the vast majority are Chinese entities? Part B.3.
preempts this potential objection and studies the project participants datapoint. The project participants’ data corroborate and further strengthen the
conclusion that China sold its credits. Part B.3. provides a method to
double-check the empirical results in Part B.2., and Part B.4. answers other
potential objections that may be leveled against the survey.
1. Methodology. The following methodology was employed to
calculate and deduce the empirical results. First, this study utilized the
same sample as the Board, which showed approximately 2,100 projects
were registered before July 2012 (see Figure 4). This survey included 2,168
projects, 7 more than the 2,161 projects in the Board’s release.132 Second,
the powers of attorney for all the 2,161 projects are included in the study.
Third, this investigation focuses on the power to instruct the Board to
transfer the credits. As per carbon rules, the Board has a specific power of
attorney form with regard to credits,133 which allows for three different
powers to be transferred.134 The most important power involves “the
authority to instruct the secretariat and communicate with the Clean
Development Mechanism’s Executive Board on the allocation and
forwarding of CERs.”135 This provision is easily the critical one, a signal of

132. This study utilizes July 7, 2012 rather than July 9, 2012. At a quick glance, it may appear
strange that this survey yields a greater number of projects registered by July 7 than the number
released by the Board on July 9, 2012. However, the data in Figure 4 was released on July 7; this is not
the cut-off date for the Board’s numbers. This explains why Figure 7 presents 2,168 Chinese projects
whereas Figure 4 reflects 2,161 Chinese projects.
133. See CDM REGISTRY, UNFCCC, supra note 98
134. See supra note 100 for discussion on the three types of powers that can be transferred through
the carbon market’s power of attorney form.
135. This is the text found in the majority of forms reviewed in this study. However, the Board
periodically modifies the form. For most recent language (with minor amendment in text) approved by
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ownership or title transfer, and so, the review focuses on this entry. To
avoid confusing transfers of title and ownership interests tracked in this
study with less relevant powers such as to merely be copied on
communication, this examination excludes the latter.136 For instance,
contractors assisting the firm with developing its carbon project may be
copied on communication. In which case, the project owner will include an
entry in the form (to the Board) specifying the name and details of any
other firm (other than the owner) who ought to be copied on
communication. This permission is significantly different from ownership
and the power to transfer credits. This review excludes these ancillary
permissions included in the form to avoid muddling the primary
conclusion. In short, eliminating other entries in the form, which are not
clear indicators of ownership, ensures the survey is more accurate.
Fourth, the form allows for the power of attorney to be “sole,”137
“shared”138 or “joint,”139 and the survey employs the following
methodology:140 When a buyer had the sole right to provide instructions, it
was assigned a 1. When a buyer had joint or shared rights with another
buyer, each buyer was assigned a .50. The vast majority of the forms
granted either “sole” or “joint” right to instruct the Board regarding the
transfer of credits.141

the Board see supra note 100. See also CDM REGISTRY, UNFCCC, supra note 98 for the Board’s
official template. The Modalities of Communication is the approved form issued by the Board. In this
form, participants indicate whether that focal point(s) has sole (or shared) delegated authority with
respect to the distribution and forwarding of CERs. Interview with Paul Curnow, supra note 101.
136. The excluded provisions are: “(i) authority to add, delete or withdraw Project Participants,”
and “(iii) communication, and to be copied on communication with the Board (and secretariat).” See
also CDM REGISTRY, UNFCCC, supra note 98.
137. “Sole Focal Point authority - A signature of an authorised signatory of ONLY the entity
listed below is required for communication related to the corresponding scope of authority.” CDM
REGISTRY, UNFCCC, supra note 98, at 1. Section II. Annex I parties (advanced nations) buying credits
from China typically insist sellers authorize buyers as the sole Focal Point. Occasionally, Chinese
sellers insist on being joint focal point, in which case the buyers include clauses insisting the seller will
agree to sign any request for distribution of credits as submitted the buyer. See Interview with Paul
Curnow, supra note 101.
138. “Shared Focal Point authority - A signature of an authorised signatory of ANY of the
entities listed below is required for communication related to the corresponding scope of authority.”
CDM REGISTRY, UNFCCC, supra note 98, at 1.
139. “Joint Focal Point authority - A signature of an authorised signatory of ALL entities listed
below are required for communication related to the corresponding scope of authority.” Id.
140. There has been no known litigation or public dispute with regard to these forms, such as how
the Board would interpret notice rules for receiving instructions (in case more than one party claims the
credits through two parties named in the original power of attorney). And so, this Article will not
speculate on possible disputes and outcomes that have not arisen in the real world.
141. For complete list of the corporate groups and entities in whose favor the powers of attorney
are drawn, whether sole, shared or joint, see infra Appendix 2.
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Fifth, if parties submitted revised forms, the study included the most
recent ones. For instance, Chinese Seller A sold the credits to Carbon
Trader B, who subsequently sold them to Investment Bank C. If the sale
occurs early, before credits are issued, then Bank C will ask Seller A to file
a revised power of attorney in favor of Bank C. In this case, this study
would have identified Bank C as the buyer. However, if Carbon Trader B
sold the credits to Investment Bank C after the credits were issued (and in
Trader B’s account), Trader B would merely transfer the credits to Bank
C’s account. In these circumstances, neither Seller A nor Trader B would
have filed a revised power of attorney form in favor of Bank C. The sale to
Bank C will not be recorded by this study. In short, this examination
excludes secondary market sales that are not verifiable through Registry
records.142
This secondary market exclusion is noteworthy, for the following
reason: for 243 projects, there was no power of attorney on record or the
form only mentioned the original Chinese entity’s name.143 These are
classified separately as “No Power of Attorney” on record.144 Similarly, the
projects that only named the Chinese firm in the form were retained in the
“China” column.145 Plausibly, these projects (where no powers of attorney
were filed, or named only the Chinese project developer) may have been
subsequently sold to foreign buyers.146 This is especially likely, since
Chinese corporations prefer to sell the credits early rather than hoard them
hoping that prices will rise in future.147 Erring on the side of caution, this
review retains these projects in the China column. Thus, traders in Europe
and elsewhere may own more of the China credits than this study
suggests.148 In short, the evidence does not support the China argument that
if the United States ratifies the Kyoto Protocol, enormous U.S. wealth will
flow into Beijing. To the contrary, the numbers suggest the China argument
may be a myth.

142. The vast majority of projects in this study utilize older versions of the Modalities of
Communication form, which do not record secondary sales. However, in future, it may be possible to
track secondary market sales because the more recent form provides a column for this data. See CDM
REGISTRY, UNFCCC, supra note98, at 2 (“Use this Section for Post-Registration Submissions Only”).
143. No powers of attorney forms are available for 101 projects, and the forms for 142 projects
only name the original Chinese project owner. See infra Figure 7. Details on these 243 projects are
available in the Excel file compiled (on file with author and available on request).
144. Complete data compiled in Excel format (on file with author and available on request).
145. Id.
146. The form also allows the Chinese project developer to nominate an employee or subsidiary. In
the case of such entries, they are retained in the “China” column. See infra Figure 7.
147. Interview with Carbon Trader, supra note 101.
148. See infra Figure 7.
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2. The Results. The raw data tells the story. The power of attorney
forms are frequently filed with the Registry, as early as at the start of the
accreditation cycle, and reveal striking results. Close to 90 percent of the
2,168 Chinese projects in that period include a power of attorney in favor
of international buyers.149
One-hundred and one projects (or 4.66 percent of Chinese projects) do
not include a power of attorney.150 The forms for 142 projects (or 6.55
percent approximately) name only Chinese developers or original
owners.151 The vast majority, 1,925 projects, include forms conferring nonChinese corporations (or buyers) with the right to instruct the Board to
transfer the credits generated.152
Analyzing who held the powers of attorney for these credits yields
illuminating results. Over 158 corporate groups are involved and together
hold the powers of attorney for 1,925 projects.153 Of these, a vast majority
of buyers own only a few projects; for example, several buyers own only
10–20 projects.154 In fact, only 9 buyers own fifty or more projects, and
these buyers are included in Figure 7.155 These 9 buyers account for 822.5
projects.156 The rest own less than 50 projects each, and are combined
under “Other Buyers.” The Other Buyers account for 1102 projects, or 50
percent of China’s portfolio.
The specific corporate groups that own a significant stake are as
follows. The Sweden based Carbon Asset Management, is the single largest
buyer and owns approximately 148 projects or 6.85 percent.157 The Geneva

149. Complete data compiled in Excel format (on file with author and available on request).
150. See infra Figure 7.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See infra Table 1, Appendix 2 for the list of over 158 buyers. Of these 158 buyers, over 40
corporate groups buy projects through multiple subsidiaries or related entities. For the list of the related
entities that are combined to generate Table 1 and Figure 7, see Table 2, Appendix 2. See also
explanation infra note 155.
154. See infra app. 2, tbl.1.
155. Generally, the buyers are listed as they are named in the original forms, with one exception
(described below). Several buyers (Camco, for instance) prefer to own credits utilizing more than one of
its entities or subsidiaries. In other words, one firm through multiple subsidiaries may own credits from
one project. Similarly, a buyer operating through its parent company and related entities purchases
credits from different projects. Hence, this study combines select entities to more accurately represent
who owns the credits. For better analysis, only entities that are prima facie or obviously closely related
entities are aggregated. No additional sleuthing to discover precise shareholder patterns etc. is
undertaken. For the list of the entities that are combined, see Table 2, Appendix 2. As a result, several
buyers (Camco, for instance) end up with over 50 projects. This review adds up the powers of attorney
held by several Camco companies in order to arrive at the Group’s figures.
156. See infra Figure 7.
157. The final results yield figures in decimal point (or fractions) because of the methodology
followed to allocate projects involving multiple buyers. See supra Part III.B.1 (Methodology).
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based Carbon Resource Management, having purchased around 126
projects or 5.812 percent, cinches the second place.158 U.K. based
corporations EcoSecurities and RWE come in third and fourth respectively,
with 118 projects or 5.44 percent and 99 projects or 4.56 percent.159
Switzerland’s Vitol S.A., United States’ EDF Trading, and Japan’s
Mitsubishi are the other large buyers who possess the powers of attorney
for more than fifty projects.160
As discussed earlier, even the 11 percent (or 253 of the total 2,168
projects) where owners did not file any power of attorney form (or where
the form names only the Chinese owner) may have been subsequently
sold.161 Whether or not these credits are still with China cannot be verified
through publicly available data.162 The study merely indicates the owners
either did not file a power of attorney, or listed only a Chinese corporation.
Assuming arguendo, China still owns these credits, this does little to dilute
the findings—China liquidated vast majority of its credits, and mostly nonChinese firms based in industrialized nations bought these credits. So, this
Article will err on the side of the caution and leave the 153 projects for
which no forms were filed, under the China account.

158. See infra app. 2, tbl.1. Carbon Asset Management has since become a wholly owned
subsidiary of Vitol S.A., increasing Vitol’s carbon portfolio. To keep it simple, and since it is
unnecessary for the central thesis of disputing the China argument, this Article will not unnecessarily
meander into identifying which parent corporation may own what percentage of credits indirectly. This
study uses the entity named in the documents submitted to the Registry.
159. Id.
160. See infra Figure 7.
161. The International Carbon Trader, supra note 101, stated, Chinese entities prefer to sell credits
rather than wait for possible higher prices in future. Hence, he surmised, it is highly likely that even the
credits ostensibly in the China column – for which no forms were available, were sold to foreign buyers
after the project was registered, or credits issued. For further discussion, see supra Part III.B.1.
162. The Registry only requires the owner to file these forms, and keep these records when credits
are sold at early stages of the project, before the certificates are issued. If any owner sells them after the
Board has credited the certificates (into the owner’s account), the owners do not have to file any forms
with the Registry. Hence, later sales cannot be tracked or calculated with certainty. See supra Part
III.B.1.
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FIG
GURE 7: Who Owns the Crredits Now?
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second empirical study that tests for and eliminates the possibility that
Chinese buyers are involved, albeit purchasing smaller stakes.
3. A Second Test. In addition to powers of attorney, the Registry
provides a second method to verify whether the conclusion that China has
sold its portfolio to international buyers is indeed accurate. The Registry
also maintains records on “project participants,” or countries that are
participating in a particular project.163 For example, the Chinese project
owner names several entities as “project participants,” who have the right
to be copied on all communication from the Board.164 It is standard
business practice for various buyers to be listed as participants, and the
owner can nominate one or more of the participant firms as the holder of
the power of attorney to transfer credits, as explained earlier.165 There is a
possibility, however small, that the Chinese owner provides a power of
attorney to an international buyer but all other buyers are Chinese entities.
163. The information is listed under the “Other Parties” column, Project Activities Submitted for
Registration, PROJECT CYCLE SEARCH, UNFCC, http http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/request_reg.html
(last visited Dec. 28, 2013).
164. Project Participants, BAKER & MCKENZIE, http://cdmrulebook.org/69 (last visited Dec. 28,
2013) (“Project participant is defined in the CDM Glossary of Terms as follows: [A] project participant
is (a) a Party involved, which has indicated to be a project participant, or (b) a private and/or public
entity authorized by a Party involved to participate in a CDM project activity (CDM Glossary of Terms,
Version 03). An entity can become a project participant before or after registration of a CDM project,
but must always have a letter of approval from a Kyoto Protocol Party before it can do so and
subsequently receive CERs from that project. Receipt of CERs by way of a secondary transfer
represents an exception to this.”). See also id (Rights of Project Participants). As a carbon expert
explains: “Project Participants are the private or public entities that each Annex I party [advanced
nation] and the host country authorize to participate in and undertake the project. Annex I parties decide
which private or public entity are allowed to participate in the Kyoto Protocol market (the rules are left
up to each Annex I party); whereas the host country decides on whether the seller may participate in the
market, and whether the project meets the sustainable development requirements of that host country.
These approvals are entirely separate from the internal arrangements the firms may put in place with
respect to communicating with the Board regarding with credits. Under the Kyoto Protocol rules,
project participants must agree on who will act as focal point(s) for the project and what delegated
authority the focal point (s) would have in respect of the distribution of CERs (into relevant accounts of
participants once credits are issued). Under the market rules, only participants can receive credits
directly from the Registry into their account; this is why Buyers insist on not only being the focal point
but also participant so that they can receive the credits directly into their accounts.” Interview with Paul
Curnow, supra note 101.
165. For instance, in the case of Project 0011: Project for GHG Emission Reduction by Thermal
Oxidation of HFC23 in Jiangsu Meilan Chemical CO. Ltd., Jiangsu Province, China, a slew of
corporations from Japan, Spain, Italy, Denmark, Netherlands, Canada (subsequently withdrawn), U.K.,
Finland, Norway, Germany, Switzerland, France, and Sweden were involved and most were listed on
the form as to be copied on communications. But the project owner provided the sole right to transfer
credits to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. See Project 0011: Project for
GHG Emission Reduction by Thermal Oxidation of HFC23 in Jiangsu Meilan Chemical CO. Ltd.,
Jiangsu
Province,
China,
UNFCCC,
available
at
https://cdm.unfccc.
int/Projects/DB/JQA1144312006.34/view (last visited Dec. 28, 2013).
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If this is commonly occurring, then China continues to own significant
number of credits, which could negate the results of Part B.2., showing that
China alienated its credits. Thus, this Part B.3. will examine the project
participants’ data to verify whether the conclusion in Part B.2. is accurate.
The Registry data on project participants provides one additional
advantage—it names and lists the countries that are involved which allows
us to discern whether China owns more credits than estimated in Part B.2.
The following methodology is employed to examine the country
participant data. As with the power of attorney analysis, this survey
includes all the Chinese projects, eliminating any objection of selection
bias. Next, for each of the 2,227 projects, all the participants are included in
the study.166 The project participants’ data has one advantage over the
powers of attorney data – it lists the country corresponding to each
corporation. Hence, it helps us accurately measure which countries own
and are participating in China’s carbon credit projects.
Though the power of attorney is generally drawn in favor of one party,
the number of project participants is typically higher - typically three (or
more) parties, which frequently include participants from different
countries. In many transactions, two or more buyers create a joint venture
or other business arrangement and act together to buy the credits earned
from a single project.167
When projects involved more than one buyer, the participation was
weighted so that each participating buyer was assigned an equal share in
the project they are involved in. If the form listed only one buyer, that
buyer received full credit (or was assigned “one”). For projects with
multiple buyers, the share (or the number one) was divided between the
buyers.168 For example, if Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom bought credits from the same project, each participant is assigned
a share of .334. The shares of the buyers from one country are then added
up to create a country’s total weighted participation average.
One possible objection to this study could be that it provides equal
weight to all countries, whereas a nation could have bought more or less
shares than others. For instance, three buyers from the United Kingdom,
Netherlands, and Switzerland respectively buy credits from one project. Let
us assume arguendo that the U.K. entity acquires a majority of the credits,
166. For instance, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Switzerland are
listed as project participants for Nanjing Tianjingwa Landfill Gas to Electricity Project. See Project
0071: Nanjing Tianjingwa Landfill Gas to Electricity Project, PROJECT CYCLE SEARCH, UNFCCC,
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/DNV-CUK1129289693.13/view (last visited Dec. 28, 2013). Figures
8 and 9, infra, are created by extracting the data for all the Chinese projects. The complete data as
collated and compiled in Excel format is on file with the author (and available on request).
167. For an illustration, see infra note 172.
168. Id.
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and the Swiss and Dutch corporations buy smaller shares. In this case, the
United Kingdom’s quantitative participation would be higher than the .334
that is assigned as per the survey’s methodology.169
This objection can be easily set aside for the following reasons. First,
the initial study tracking powers of attorney already examines and
measures senior buyers.170 In contrast, the second study measuring
participants is intended solely to corroborate the earlier finding that China
sold its portfolio to international firms. Second, this Article demonstrates
that China has alienated its gargantuan credit stockpile and so a possible
U.S. entry into the emissions market will not provide as much gain to
China as the conventional wisdom suggests. The number of shares the
United Kingdom buys relative to Switzerland is beyond the scope of this
Article. Third, sharing arrangements between private buyers cannot be
conclusively tracked through public records. Since any estimates of such
private arrangements would be speculative, it is not included here. This
Article seeks to test the veracity of the China argument, and so, restraining
from speculating on each buyer’s precise share does not affect the
conclusions of this study.
Lastly, the following feature is worth noticing before the reader turns to
the empirical results. There is little possibility that an entity named in this
form may be a hired service provider: Owners would not be willing to
authorize contractors with the power to communicate with regulators, such
as the Board. And so, the owners are unlikely to include, as a participant, a
contractor who merely provides carbon development services (for example,
in developing the registration documents).171 Thus, the possibility that an
entity named in this form may be a hired service provider is easily
disproved.
The results of this study corroborate the power of attorney study and
further strengthen the conclusions. As shown in Figure 8 below, the United
Kingdom is the single largest buyer, picking up 742.43 projects or 36
percent of Chinese projects.172 Switzerland cinches the second place, and
169. In this example, according to carbon market rules, the Swiss and U.K. buyers’ permission
would be required to transfer any of the credits. In practice, it is unlikely that lawyers or owners of a
larger chunk of the shares would agree to confer a minor buyer with the power to block or refuse to
transfer credits. So this possibility can be eliminated.
170. See supra Part III.B.1–2.
171. See MIRIAM HINOSTROZA, UNEP RISØE CENTER, CDM PDD GUIDEBOOK: NAVIGATING THE
PITFALLS 28 (3d ed. 2011), available at http://cd4cdm.org/Publications/PDDguidebook_3rdEdition.pdf
(“Pitfall 2: Project participants not clearly identified . . . . Typically, consultants, DNAs and local
municipalities do not have a share in the distribution of CERs.”). The owner will be conferring
significant powers to parties named in the form, and absent transfer in ownership, corporations do not
nominate unrelated third parties lightly.
172. The final results for number of projects sometimes involve decimal points (or fractions)
because multiple buyers frequently purchase credits from one project, and so, the project share is
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purchases 14 percent or 302.79 projects. Japanese buyers are third in line,
and account for 12 percent or 276.78 projects. Netherlands and Sweden
also own substantial portions of Chinese projects, accounting for 12 percent
and 9 percent, respectively. The following European nations are the other
significant purchasers – Germany (4 percent), Austria and France (2
percent each), and Spain, Italy, Norway and Finland (1 percent each).
“Others” in Figure 8 includes some countries that own credits from a few
projects. If we utilize this project participant study (rather than the right to
transfer the credits we measured in Part B.2.) to determine what percentage
of credits China owns, then by this measure China has sold over 96 percent
of its projects.
Less than 4 percent (84 projects) do not list other countries as
participants in the projects carried out in China.173 As discussed earlier, this
does not prove that these credits are still with China, or that they were not
sold subsequently.174 Similar to the first study measuring powers of
attorney, when no public records are available, the second study on project
participants’ data also retains these projects in the ‘China’ column. The
second study shows that China liquidated its holdings and that traders in
industrialized nations now own the credits, corroborating the first empirical
study which relies on power of attorney holders data.

divided between these buyers (to accurately represent the facts, and to avoid double counting). For a
discussion of the methodology, see supra Part III.A.
173. See infra Figure 8.
174. For an explanation of the methodology utilized when no powers of attorney exist, see supra
Part III.A.1.
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FIGURE 8: International Participants Listed for Chinese Projects
2,227 Projects Registered until July 9, 2012175

** Others include Norway (21.61), Denmark (12.80), Canada (1.61),
Portugal (6.33), Belgium (4.22), Luxembourg (1.22), Australia (3.5),
Liechtenstein (1), and Ireland (.75).
One possible objection to this study could be that it counts the number
of projects, rather than the number of credits. In other words, what if China
sold its small projects but retains the projects that generate more credits?
China does not list any other participant for 84 projects (or 4 percent of the
total projects). Does this mean China continues to own a significant
number of credits (albeit through a smaller number of projects)? To
account for this possibility, an additional study was made measuring the
number of credits (rather than number of projects) that the international
buyers have bought.176
As Figure 9, reveals, calculating the number of credits rather than
projects reduces China’s share even further, and only marginally changes
175. Figure 8 is generated utilizing all the Chinese projects registered as of July 9, 2012, which
amount to 2,227 projects. By contrast, Figure 4 is generated utilizing data the UNFCCC released on
July 9, 2012, which lists 2,161 as the total number of projects from China. The UNFCCC chart may
have been released on July 9, 2012 but prepared earlier. This explains the difference in the total
number of Chinese projects. In any event, including a few additional projects does not adversely impact
the results. Further, the number of projects is in decimals because when multiple buyers are included,
projects are divided between them as explained in supra note 172.
176. See infra Figure 9.
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the shares of individual nations (or buyers).177 Simply put, the numbers do
not support the possibility that China engages in strategic behavior, selling
its small projects while retaining the largest ones to obtain vast sums from
the United States, if the United States chooses to enter the market.
FIGURE 9: Measuring the Number of Credits
Canada - 2%
7205585.017 Credits
Spain - 2%
7343478.198 Credits

Austria - 2%
6439281.493 Credits

Others - 4%
15031042.74 Credits
Retained by China -2%
9687728 Credits

France - 2%
10162666.69 Credits
Italy - 3%
10773023.61 Credits

Retained by China
UK
Switzerland

Germany - 3%
13920596.18 Credits

Japan
Netherlands

Sweden - 6%
22954414.02 Credits

Sweden
UK - 33%
139491942.6 Credits

Germany
Italy

Netherlands - 11%
43555873.6 Credits

France
Spain
Canada

Japan - 14%
58675184.35 Credits

Austria
Switzerland - 16%
65699332.45 Credits

Others

4. Response to Possible Objections. There may be two other objections
to this data. A first objection may be that the studies in this Article only
track “first” or initial sales and not any subsequent ones. Hence, one can
argue, the U.K. traders could have subsequently sold a large number of the
credits they bought and thus if the United States enters the market and buys
credits, the revenues may flow to another country and not to London.
Conceivably, this scenario may be true, but this objection does not affect
the central argument of this Article. With regard to this “subsequent sales”
objection, the fact still remains that China has sold its credits, putting to
rest U.S. fears that enormous cash will flow from America to China if the
United States signs the Kyoto Protocol.
With regard to the powers of attorney study, one objection could be as
follows. A buyer may buy only a portion of the total credits emanating
from a project – either a fixed number or percentage, and the Chinese
producer may have retained a sizeable amount. This possibility can be
177. The methodology used to tabulate the data and generate Figure 9 is as follows. The Registry
provides an estimate of credits expected from each project. Each country is assigned an equal share of
the credits from each project, and then each country’s number of credits from all its projects are added
up to generate a nation’s total number of credit purchases.
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easily set-aside. First, it is highly unlikely that a firm would be willing to
grant another firm the complete right to transfer all credits, if the buyer is
only acquiring a small percentage of the credits.178 Second, this scenario is
even more improbable given the economics of developing a carbon
project:179 Developing a carbon project involves significant transaction
costs, including (a) the costs of preparing and filing the registration
documents, and (b) agencies’ fees for various services.180 These costs are
frequently borne by buyers (if they purchase credits prior to registration),
and so, buyers are unwilling to incur these costs if they gain only a small
percentage of credits from a project, as confirmed by the Carbon Trader.181
Moreover, well-placed carbon traders confirm that Chinese producers
choose to enter into, and sell their credits early, (rather than storing the
credits expecting prices to rise in future).182 Moreover, a leading carbon
178. As per the carbon market rules, owners have the option of choosing to provide buyers with a
full (“sole”) right to transfer the credit or share it with other entities. See the discussion on “sole,”
“shared,” and “joint” power of attorney in supra notes141–143 and accompanying text.
179. Carbon service firms (preparing forms) increasingly prefer to be paid in credits. They prefer
to buy all or most of the credits at a lower rate rather than earn a small consultancy fee. Hence, the
possibility that firms named as participants or holding powers of attorney provide only services (with no
ownership stake in the credits) can be refuted. Interview with Carbon Trader, supra note 101.
180. Developing a carbon project involves the following costs: (a) Agencies’ charges - For
instance, agencies’ fees increase if the parties opt for more frequent verification; (b) Board’s
registration and issuance fees - This approximately ranges around 0.10 – 0.20 USD per tonne of CO2 for
registration, and similar fees are charged every time credits were issued; (c) Adaptation fee - 2 percent
of credits are retained by the Board to assist nations that are threatened by climate change
consequences; (d) Costs of preparing PDD and other document required for registration. Kyoto
Protocol, supra note 4, at art. 12 para. 8; Background Paper of the UNFCCC Workshop on the
Adaptation Fund on Share of Proceeds to Assist in Meeting the Costs of Adaptation, at 1–3 (May 3–5,
2006),
available
at
http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/financial_mechanism_gef/applicat
ion/pdf/adaptation_sop.pdf. See also McNish, supra note 17, at 413 (providing a detailed description of
the various transaction costs involved in obtaining credits).
181. Interview with Carbon Trader, supra note 101.
182. Id. As a carbon expert explained: “Certainly the market in China for CDM projects is very
different from the approach taken by Indian sellers. In India, sellers tend to favor a unilateral approach,
i.e. developing the CDM project themselves - often without the certainty of a forward contract with an
Annex I Buyer - and then only looking to enter into spot sales once the projects were registered and
starting to generate credits. China displays the opposite practice. Indeed, the Chinese government policy
does not allow unilateral carbon projects (even though the international rules did allow it): the National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) - which is the Designated National Authority for China
- required Chinese sellers to show they have a willing Annex I Buyer and a contract in place for the sale
of the credits (and it would only be a few years later that China introduced the additional floor price
requirement into the approval process). Given China’s position on unilateral CDM, Chinese sellers
have to enter into forward sales with Annex I Buyers in order to take advantage of the CDM. It is
market practice in China - and indeed required by the NDRC - to sell 100% of the credits to the Annex I
Buyer - except where a percentage might go to a project consultant or advisor (who in turn typically
sells forward rather than seeking to hold on to them). Sellers do not retain any percentage for later sale
into the market (unlike the market practice of many Indian sellers).” Interview with Paul Curnow, supra
note 101.
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trader also explains that generally, only buyers and not consultants were
granted the power of attorney(s) forms deposited before the Board.183
Indeed, as the carbon trader explained the possibility that if any industry
owner is determined to retain the credits, perhaps with the intent to sell
them directly after the credits are issued, owners have the option to engage
carbon firms as consultants and pay them a fee (rather than agree to sell the
credits forward).184 If a Chinese producer hires a carbon consultant and opts
to develop the credits for their own account, it is unnecessary to issue a
power of attorney in favor of the consultant for the purpose of merely
developing the project, which makes it unlikely that this practice is
widespread.185
A third potential objection may be that the data is “static.” What if
China registers new projects and earns additional credits rapidly as soon as
the United States ratifies the Protocol? In that event, China could still be a
huge beneficiary of U.S. wealth, plausibly negating this survey. This
potential critique can be easily rebutted. As per carbon rules, China cannot
register past activities and so, cannot easily flood the market.186
Furthermore, there is a significant interval of time between registration (or
starting the process to earn credits) and when credits are actually earned (or
issued). Either way, the market cannot be flooded overnight. Importantly, it
is not in China’s interest to increase supply drastically when the demand
for credits is fixed (as per the Kyoto Protocol’s targets), because that will
reduce the price.187 Moreover, the arithmetic does not support this
possibility, because the vast majority of China’s credits are not “retired” or
already used to set-off past targets.188 Instead, they have been bought by
traders with the intention of subsequently selling them.189 Hence, the
United States has the option to purchase credits from a large number of
trading firms in advanced nations, as well as the other developing nations,
which totals up to 95 percent of the credits issued until now.190
In short, these potential objections may be easily overcome. The
empirical results clearly show: China sold a hefty portion of its credits and
so, any future earnings will be retained by these trading firms. Thus, the
183. Interview with Carbon Trader, supra note 101.
184. Id.
185. See supra notes 137–139.
186. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at art. 12 para. 5(c).
187. For a discussion on the fixed targets provided for advanced countries by the Kyoto Protocol,
see supra Part II.
188. I am grateful to Liz Sheargold for pointing this out.
189. See supra Figure 7.
190. See supra Figure 4 (showing that India, Brazil and other developing nations owned nearly 50
percent of the credits issued until now); supra Figure 7 (showing most of China’s projects have been
bought by carbon traders).
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findings in this study prove, it is highly implausible that enormous U.S.
wealth will be transferred to China through emissions trading. This Article,
thus, removes the biggest stumbling block that stymies U.S. legal
scholarship and policy on climate change.191 In addition to the China
argument, the existing scholarship raises a few other analytical arguments
against U.S. participation in the Kyoto Protocol, which shall be discussed
in the following Part.
IV. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
American climate change literature to date focuses on China, and the
“China myth” sharply influences the United States’ response to the global
emissions debate. Indeed, Posner and Sunstein argue, so long as China’s
emissions are not capped, the United States could not be held responsible
for climate change under either a corrective or distributive justice theory.192
Dan Farber responds to Posner and Sunstein’s argument with a moral
theory—the United States is “morally” responsible for its emissions,
independent of Chinese liability.193 Both sets of scholars base their theory
and conclusions on the premise (or fear) that U.S. wealth will flow to China
if an international emissions treaty is ratified. Indeed, this Article is the first
to check whether market facts support this presumption about China; in
fact, the evidence unearthed by this study shows the presumption is false,
and thus arrests the “China myth.”
In
addition
to
the
“China
myth,”
justice theorists point to a few theoretical reasons to argue the United States
is not obligated to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. In support, they argue that the
present regime does not fulfill the conditions of either corrective or
distributive justice theory.194 This Part will show the gaps in the theoretical
objections that justice theorists put forward.
Scholars such as Posner and Sunstein declare the climate claim falls
short of justice standards because it does not fit into one of the following
boxes: pure corrective justice or distributive justice.195 In the process,
caricatured versions of the climate claim are presented. For instance,
Posner and Sunstein present the corrective justice claim as punishing the
“United States for its wealth,” because the nations most at risk were
191. See sources cited supra note 3 for the legal scholars who have been seeking to formulate a
cogent theory for U.S. participation in the Kyoto Protocol but were stymied by the China argument. See
also sources cited supra notes 41, 44 (showing how the Senate has resisted ratifying and passing
emission regulations because of the China argument).
192. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1611–12.
193. Farber, supra note 5, at 379; Farber, supra note 3, at 17.
194. See, e.g., Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1611–12.
195. Id.
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poor.196 Similarly, they state, the grounds for distributive justice grounds
are not fulfilled because emission funds are a “crude means of
producing . . . redistribution . . . .”197 But the climate claim is different from
this wealth redistribution theorem. The greenhouse gases that the United
States emits form the crux of the claim, not its wealth.198
Furthermore, the climate claim rests not only on past emissions but also
the tonnes of greenhouse gases that the United States continues to emit at
present and in the foreseeable future.199 Posner and Sunstein, however,
ignore present and continuing emissions entirely.200 Instead, they declare,
the United States is being held liable solely because of its past emissions or
“wrongful behavior that occurred in the past,” (or the corrective justice
rationale).201 This argument misrepresents the climate claim as wholly
“backward-looking” punishment for past behavior, even though the claim
includes both past and present emissions.202 Interestingly, Posner and
Sunstein conclude, the climate justice argument fails to meet the conditions
necessary to successfully obtain compensation in a tort suit in the United
States, and so, the corrective justice claim is dissolved.203 Corrective justice
may be the philosophy informing tort law204 but that does not mean the
196. Id. at 1565.
197. Id.
198. In short, the United States is not being targeted or punished for its wealth as the Posner and
Sunstein theorem declares, but because its industrial activities led to the effluents. Other industrialized
nations such as Europe have assumed responsibility based upon this principle. The United States
remains the only major industrialized nation refusing to accept the international accord, an aspect often
under-emphasized in standard accounts. See Farber, supra note 5, at 398 (“The United States
government has stood virtually alone among industrialized countries in opposing serious action on
climate change.”).
199. For context and a cogent discussion on the arithmetic of U.S. emissions in the past and
continuing emissions (including in the future) and resulting harm see Farber, supra note 5, at 385–87
(“The [temporal pattern from 1800 to 2004], obviously, is a sharp upward movement in the amount of
[U.S.] emissions. . . . [T]he United States is on track to emit as much this decade [2000 to 2010] as it
did for the entire period from 1900 to 1940. Even if we were to stabilize the level of CO2 in the
atmosphere, climate change would continue for several decades and to a lesser extent thereafter. On the
other hand, if we were able to reduce greenhouse gas emissions sharply, global temperature increases
would moderate within a decade.”).
200. See, e.g., Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1567 (“While the emissions of the United States
are growing relatively slowly, that nation remains by far the largest contributor to the existing ‘stock’ of
greenhouse gases. Because of its past contributions, does the United States owe remedial action or
material compensation to those nations, or those citizens, most likely to be harmed by climate
change?”). Clearly, Posner and Sunstein ignore and underplay the arithmetic of U.S. emissions. Even if
China’s annual emissions today exceeds the United States’ that does not mean the United States’
emissions are erased or become zero.
201. Id. at 1592.
202. See discussion supra notes 199–200.
203. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1592.
204. Notably, Aristotle’s original discussion on justice focuses on the notion of justice and not
specific laws such as tort. See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V (Betty Radice et al. eds.,
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philosophy of corrective justice stands reduced to tort law.205 Accepting
Posner and Sunstein’s proposition will lead to the following absurd result –
if tort law requirements are not fulfilled, all corrective justice claims will be
erased.
This Article agrees with Posner and Sunstein’s analysis that a justice
theory, perhaps based upon “welfarist considerations,” as they call it, may
be better suited to address the climate change issue.206 However, this study
differs from Posner and Sunstein’s conclusion that the United States is not
responsible for its emissions because of the “China myth.” Posner and
Sunstein’s objection can be stated thusly: On the one hand, China is not
made responsible for its emissions. On the other hand, the present regime
requires the United States to compensate the victims, which in this case
includes China, even though China is one of the largest emitters today.207
Significantly, the empirical analysis in this Article disproves the factual
assumption central to Posner and Sunstein’s thesis. The Protocol does not
insist that the United States must transfer funds to China through the
emissions market. The Kyoto Protocol rules only require industrialized
nations, such as the United States (if it ratifies the Protocol), to limit their
emissions. The United States is perfectly free to offset its emission
reduction targets through domestic efforts. If any U.S. firm fails to meet its
target, it is free to purchase credits from other U.S. firms, or from sellers in
any other nation.208 There is no insistence that the United States purchase
only from China. Moreover, as the empirical study ably demonstrates, nonChinese traders now own most of the credits initially earned by China.
Hence, unlike Posner and Sunstein’s claim, the existing framework
scarcely compels ‘innocent U.S. citizens of today’ to make reparation to
non-victims in China.

J.A.K. Thomson trans., Penguin Classics 2004). Aristotle’s original discussion focuses on justice, and
two forms of particular justice – one involving distributions of honor or money or things that may be
divided, and a second part that plays a rectifying part in transactions between men. Philosophy does not
insist that the concept of justice is manifest as tort law; rather, tort law theorists have reached backward
to justify tort remedies on the basis of a justice philosophy. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective
Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U. TORONTO. L.J. 349, 349 (2002) (explaining that “corrective justice has
become central to contemporary theories of private law,” such as tort, and this is the result of legal
scholars theorizing and drawing connections with and seeking ontological reasons); ERNEST J.
WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 15–16 (Timothy Endicott et al. eds., 2012)..
205. Stated as equations, because the following equation 1 is true, that does not support the
conclusion that equation 2 is correct.
Corrective Justice  Tort (Equation 1)
Therefore, Corrective Justice ← Tort (Equation 2)
206. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1612.
207. Id.
208. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, Annex B. See also the discussion on four conditions that
would need to be fulfilled for the United States to purchase credits from China, in supra Part II..

Anand - Final (Do Not Delete)

Fall 2013]

7/17/2014 10:21 AM

THE U.S., CHINA, AND THE FUTURE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

51

Before turning to the Conclusion, this Part will make a few
observations that will be important for the development of climate justice
theory in the future. A key theoretical objection that Posner and Sunstein
put forward is that the existing framework fails to fulfill the “correlativity”
condition of corrective justice theory.209 In other words, they contend that
under the present regime, there is a mismatch between the parties being
held responsible and the parties who are injured or who must be paid
damages. Posner and Sunstein argue: First, the Protocol imposes liability
on many innocent parties210 Second, since only future generations are
effected, current citizens of developing countries cannot claim to be victims
of climate change (or at least the claim is pre-mature).211 Essentially, they
insist corrective justice is negated because a finite list of wrongdoers and
victims cannot be matched today.212
The academic focus on wrongdoers, victims, and the need for a mirror
relationship between the two (rather than the conduct or “creating
effluents”) obfuscates the concept of “personality” that informs theories of
justice. The normative concept of personality informing the theory of
justice or even responsibility for outcomes is not new. Ernest Weinrib, for
instance, discusses the Kantian concept of personality, and argues it is not
necessary for a plaintiff’s loss to be precisely equal to defendant’s gain to
fulfill the correlativity feature of corrective justice.213
Similarly, Tony Honoré states, justice “presupposes that people are
responsible for what they do and . . . for the outcome of what they do.”214
In fact, Honoré posits that people are responsible for outcomes of their
actions whether or not such results are intended or foreseeable (“outcome
responsibility”).215 Honoré’s theory is particularly apropos for and provides
four benefits to climate justice theory. First, it provides a theoretical
framework for when a state (or community) may be justified in holding a
party responsible for its actions, even in the absence of fault. Honoré
envisages a duty to pay compensation or a fine independent of the moral

209. WEINRIB, supra note 204, at 15–21.
210. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1593. (“Many Americans today are, of course,
immigrants or children of immigrants, and so not the descendants of greenhouse-gas-emitting
Americans of the past.”).
211. Id. at 1594–96 (arguing future citizens of developing countries subject to climate effects may
be the victims with valid corrective justice claim, but these claims would not have “matured” and could
not be claimed by current non-victims.).
212. In short, “corrective justice requires an identity between the victim and the claimant: the
person who is injured by the wrongdoer must be the same as the person who has a claim against the
wrongdoer.” Id. at 1595.
213. WEINRIB, supra note 204, at 15.
214. TONY HONORÉ, RESPONSIBILITY AND FAULT 7 (1999).
215. Id. at 14.
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blameworthiness of the conduct,216 which answers Posner and Sunstein’s
concern that the emissions accord is also holding non-wrongdoers liable.217
Second, outcome responsibility also answers another objection that
Posner and Sunstein point out. They argue that the Protocol cannot be
justified as an amalgam of corrective and distributive justice as these are
mutually exclusive. According to Posner and Sunstein, an emissions accord
could no longer be justified under corrective justice if it includes elements
of distributive justice.218 In effect, they rely on the Aristotelian historical
distinction between corrective and distributive justice.219 Honoré’s outcome
responsibility comes to the rescue of the Kyoto Protocol, and shows that
corrective and distributive justice may not be as mutually exclusive as
Posner and Sunstein claim. Honoré argues: Outcome responsibility “is
“inseparable from our status as persons,” or, “is central to “the identity and
character of the agent.”220 Agency or personality in turn, are inextricably
linked to corrective and distributive justice:
Our responsibility for actions and outcomes requires us to bear the risk
of bad luck both in the way we are constituted and in the external
circumstances in which we find ourselves. . . . . . .[This] system of
responsibility enables us to profit from good luck if what we do turns out
better than we intended or foresaw. . . . . . .[T]he credit we receive from
what turns out well balances the discredit we incur for what turns out
badly. We cannot take the credit without the discredit, since that would
be to violate the principle of taking the rough with the smooth – a
principle that possesses moral force and can perhaps be regarded as a
form of distributive (risk-distributive justice).221

In short, “[o]utcome responsibility is a condition of corrective justice,
but the justification of outcome responsibility depends in part on the justice
of allocating responsibility according to risk, which is a matter of
distributive justice.”222
Third, outcome responsibility dissolves Posner and Sunstein’s problem
with holding collectivities responsible. Posner and Sunstein insist that the
climate argument fails to fulfill the standards required for a valid corrective
justice argument because it renders collectivities, such as nations, morally
responsible for individuals’ actions.223 According to Honoré, “[a]ccepting

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id.
Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1597–98.
Id.
See discussion and sources cited supra note 204.
HONORÉ, supra note 214, at 10.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 13.
Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1565, 1595.
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responsibility for our actions makes for a better society,”224 and “in a
collective interest,” the law could impose liability.225
Fourth, outcome responsibility would also be able to explain the
“common yet differentiated responsibility” principle and other principles
adopted by the Convention.226 For instance, while providing a theoretical
basis for responsibility, Honoré provides flexibility for a narrower notion of
legal liability.227 In the context of the climate treaty, Honoré’s theory
enables us to recognize that all nations are responsible for emissions, and
yet, create a law that imposes liability on a smaller subset of outcomes or
countries. Thus, a theory built on this precept of outcome responsibility
would: (a) accommodate the controversial “common yet differentiated
responsibility” standard adopted by the Convention, which Posner and
Sunstein label as “doublespeak,”228 and (b) answer the United States’
objection that the climate accord imposes different standards on the United
States than it does on China.229 Clearly, outcome responsibility resolves the
analytical objections Posner and Sunstein allude to.
The outcome responsibility philosophy in conjunction with broad
moral and political philosophy, including John Rawls’ classic, A Theory of
Justice230 raises interesting possibilities for the future development of a
normative justification for climate justice.
CONCLUSION
This Article provides the first empirical study testing whether
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol will result in the massive wealth transfers
feared by the United States. To the contrary, the evidence suggested that
the “China argument” may be a myth. Legal academics and legislators have
proceeded on the presumption that the “China argument” is true. The
“China argument” has been an especially thorny problem for academics.
Legal scholars have been unable to craft a persuasive and cogent theory on
why America should participate in the Protocol, if the existing regime will
transfer huge sums of U.S. money to China. Indeed, justice theorists such
as Posner and Sunstein have argued that under existing theories of justice
224. HONORÉ, supra note 214, at 10.
225. Id. at 9.
226. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1607. See also Wiener, supra note 3, at 1824 n.67
(arguing that “extra allowances” would be needed for developing countries to make participation
attractive in an international regime.)
227. HONORÉ, supra note 214, at 1.
228. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1607.
229. See supra notes 30, 31, 34.
230. JOHN RAWLS, THE THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). See generally AMARTYA SEN, IDEA OF
JUSTICE (2009).

Anand - Final (Do Not Delete)

54

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

7/17/2014 10:21 AM

[Vol. XXIV:1

the United States has no obligation to ratify the Protocol as long as it does
not place similar responsibilities and financial burdens on China as it would
on the United States.231 Dan Farber sought to answer justice theorists’
argument with an argument from moral theory, saying that the United
States is “morally responsible” for its emissions, and that its obligations are
independent of China’s responsibilities for its emissions.232 Farber’s
response may be logically correct but fails to alleviate U.S. concern that the
Protocol would become another avenue for American wealth to flow into
China.
In fact, the U.S. Senate has refused to ratify the Protocol because it
treats China differently than the United States. Senator Chuck Hagel
(during Senate discussions on the Byrd-Hagel Resolution that he jointly
proposed to reject the Protocol) chastised the administration for
“advocating legally binding emission reductions for the United States and
not for nearly 130 other countries, like China.”233 Senator Byrd emphasized
America’s refusal to join the Protocol was directly connected to the
Protocol’s provisions that did not bind China in a manner similar to the
United States. He stated that, so long as the treaty did not impose
restrictions on China, “There will be no incentive for the Senate to approve
such a treaty. I can guarantee you that there will be a mountain in the way
which a mustard seed of faith will not, in itself, remove.”234
Legal scholars and law-makers have presumed the “China argument” is
true, without verifying whether this assumption has any basis in fact. This
Article unearthed empirical evidence which shows that facts do not support
the “China argument”. The study revealed China alienated most of the
carbon credits initially awarded to Chinese corporations. Indeed, there is
little evidence or possibility that ratifying the emissions treaty will result in
China gaining huge sums from America.
Thus, the survey exposed the “China argument” as a myth, and makes
two important contributions. One, this Article eliminated the key issue
preventing justice and moral theorists from crafting a climate justice
theory, and thus, addresses a critical gap in scholarship. Two, it renders
vital assistance to legislators too. Assuming the “China myth” is correct,
the U.S. Senate continues to oppose U.S. participation in the Protocol and
emission regulation.235 Thus, by arresting the “China myth,” this Article
dissolves the main objection pointed to by the U.S. Senate when opposing
U.S. participation in the international emissions accord.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

See supra note 6.
See supra note 8.
S. Rep. No. 105-54, at 10 (1997)
Id. at 18.
See supra notes 31, 34.
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Indeed, this Article epitomizes Michael Heise’s argument, “Where
empirical questions lurk, data warrant at least as much respect as that
accorded opinions and words. . . . . . . Empirical work sheds important light
on old legal issues and identifies and speaks to issues that the more
traditional theoretical and doctrinal genres cannot reach.”236 This study
joins the long and distinguished line of scholarship that has publicized the
importance of empirical research to law.237

236. Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 807, 833-34 (1999).
237. For the classic exposition on point, see Peter Shuck, Why don’t Law Professors Do More
Empirical Research?, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 323, 323-24 (1989). See also Richard Posner, OVERCOMING
LAW 210 (1995); Derek Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570
(1983); Lawrence Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1986); Richard
Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U.L. REV.1 (1998). Scholars from Justice Holmes to
legal realists have emphasized the importance of empirical work. For early mentions as well as the
history behind empirical legal research, see Michael Heise, The Past, Present and Future of Empirical
Legal Scholarship, Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 4 ILL. L. REV. 819 (2002).
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APPENDIX 1: COMPLETE LIST OF COUNTRIES WITH REGISTERED PROJECTS
(REPRESENTED IN FIGURES 6 AND 6A)
The following table includes all individual nations comprising the “Rest
of” regional categories as well as the large contributors listed in Figure 6,
totaling to 4,908 Projects.

Host Nation
China
India
Brazil
Mexico
Vietnam
Malaysia
Indonesia
Thailand
Republic of Korea
Chile
Philippines
Rest of South America
Bolivia
Uruguay
Paraguay
Guyana
Ecuador
Argentina
Colombia
Peru
Rest of Asia
Bangladesh
Cambodia
Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea
Laos
Bhutan
Mongolia

Percentage of
Number of
Projects
Projects
49.49%
2429
19.64%
964
4.95%
243
3.16%
155
2.91%
143
2.44%
120
1.69%
83
1.65%
81
1.55%
76
1.26%
62
1.24%
61
2.95 %
145
0.12%
6
0.18%
9
0.04%
2
0.02%
1
0.39%
19
0.63%
31
0.86%
42
0.71%
35
2.77%
136
0.06%
3
0.12%
6
0.02%
0.08%
0.04%
0.08%

1
4
2
4
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Nepal
Pakistan
Singapore
Sri Lanka
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Cyprus
Iran
Qatar
Syria
UAE
Uzbekistan
Georgia
Israel
Rest of Africa
Cameroon
Democratic Republic of the
Congo
Ethiopia
Ghana
Jordan
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Rwanda
Senegal
Cote d’Ivorie
Tunisia
Uganda
Morocco
Mozambique
Zambia
Madagascar
Mali
Rest of Europe
Albania

57

0.12%
0.31%
0.04%
0.22%
0.10%
0.02%
0.16%
0.22%
0.02%
0.06%
0.12%
0.29%
0.06%
0.61%
2.04%
0.04%

6
15
2
11
5
1
8
11
1
3
6
14
3
30
100
2

0.04%
0.02%
0.02%
0.08%
0.16%
0.02%
0.02%
0.06%
0.08%
0.06%
0.04%
0.24%
0.16%
0.02%
0.02%
0.04%
0.02%
0.29%
0.06%

2
1
1
4
8
1
1
3
4
3
2
12
8
1
1
2
1
14
3
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Bosnia and Herzegovina
Serbia
The former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia
Republic of Moldova
Rest of North and Central
America
Costa Rica
Cuba
El Salvador
Guatemala
Panama
Jamaica
Dominican Republic
Nicaragua
Honduras
Rest of Oceania
Fiji
Papua New Guinea

[Vol. XXIV:1

0.02%
0.08%

1
4

0.04%
0.08%

2
4

1.79%
0.22%
0.04%
0.16%
0.29%
0.20%
0.04%
0.10%
0.18%
0.55%
0.16%
0.04%
0.12%

88
11
2
8
14
10
2
5
9
27
8
2
6
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APPENDIX 2: COMPLETE LIST OF POWER OF ATTORNEY HOLDERS
TABLE 1: POWER OF ATTORNEY HOLDERS (LEADING TO FIGURE 7)
Methodology: Please note as per carbon market rules, the Executive Board
accepts different types of powers of attorney. The most important involved
“the authority to instruct the secretariat and communicate with the C[lean]
D[evelopment] M[echanism] E[xecutive] B[oard] on the allocation and
forwarding of C[ertified] E[mission] R[eduction]s” This is the precise
power that was measured in this study. This power of attorney may be
“sole,” “shared,” or “joint” though the vast majority were either “sole” or
“joint.” Additional rows were included and identified as “joint” or “shared”
when applicable. When a buyer had the sole right to provide instructions, it
was assigned 1. When a buyer had joint or shared rights with another
buyer, each buyer was assigned .50 in order to create Figure 7.
Summary
Total Number of Projects in China - 2168i
Power of Attorney Holders

Number Percentage
of
of
Projects Projects**
No Power of Attorney on Record
101
4.659%
Only Chinese Party
142
6.550%
International Buyer
1925
88.792%
Total number of registered projects as of July 7, 2012.
2 Percentage calculated based on total number of China projects (i.e.,
2,168).
International Buyers
Power of Attorney
Holders
1 AandT Carbon Asset Co.,
Limited
2 ACT Carbon Capital Ltd.
3 Arcadia Energy (Suisse)
S.A.
4 Arreon Carbon*

Number Percentage Type Projects
of
of 2,168
of
Projects Projects Rights
1
0.046% Sole
1
5

0.231% Sole

5

6

0.277% Sole

2

Joint

4

2.445% Sole

43

53
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Power of Attorney
Holders

5 Asian Development Bank,
as Trustee for the Asia
Pacific Carbon Fund† ††
6 Asian Development Bank,
as Trustee for the Asia
Pacific Carbon Fund and
the Future Carbon Fund† ††
7 Asja Environment
International B.V.
Mendrisio Branch
8 Barclays Bank PLC

[Vol. XXIV:1

Number Percentage Type Projects
of
of 2,168
of
Projects Projects Rights
Joint
10
17

1

0.830% Sole

8

Joint

8

0.830% Sole
Joint

1

2

0.092% Sole

2

12

0.554% Sole

12

9 Biogas Technology Ltd

2

0.092% Sole

2

10 BKW FMB Energie AG

2

0.092% Sole
Joint

11 Blue World Carbon Capital
PCC

12 BNP Paribas

13 Bunge Emissions Holdings
S.A.R.L.
14 Cambridge Funds
Investment Co., Ltd
15 Camco*

16 Cantor Fitzgerald Europe
17 Carbon Asset

6

2

0.277% Sole
Shared

2

Joint

4

0.231% Sole

1

Joint

4

7

0.323% Sole

7

7

0.323% Sole

7

52

2.399% Sole

30

Joint

22

1

0.046% Sole

1

148.5

6.850% Sole

144

5
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Power of Attorney
Holders
Management*††

18 Carbon Capital
Management*††

19 Carbon Resource
Management*

61

Number Percentage Type Projects
of
of 2,168
of
Projects Projects Rights
Shared
3.5

16

126

Joint

1

0.738% Sole

8

Shared

1.5

Joint

6.5

5.812% Sole

83

Joint

43

20 Cargill International S.A.*

29

1.338% Sole

29

21 Caspervandertak
Consulting BV
22 CCAN Consulting GmbH††

1

0.046% Sole

1

0.5

0.023% Sole
Joint

0.5

2

0.092% Sole

2

3

0.138% Sole

3

10

0.461% Sole

10

26 CFL Carbon Limited

1

0.046% Sole

1

27 China Carbon N.V††

8

0.369% Sole

6

Joint

2
4

23 Ceres Carbon Securities
Ltd.
24 ČEZ, a.s.
25 CF Carbon Fund II Limited

28 Chubu Electric Power Co.,
Inc.
29 Citigroup Global Markets
Limited

4

0.185% Sole

5

0.231% Sole

30 Climate Bridge Ltd.

6

Joint

5

0.277% Sole

5

Joint

1
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Power of Attorney
Holders
31 Climate Cent Foundation
32 Climate Change Capital*

Number Percentage Type Projects
of
of 2,168
of
Projects Projects Rights
1
0.046% Sole
1
25

1.153% Sole

33 Climate Change Investment
II S.A.SICAR††

1

0.046% Sole

34 Climate Corporation
Emissions Trading GmbH
35 Climate Opportunity Fund
Ky††
36 Climate Protection Invest
AG††
37 ConocoPhillips (U.K.)*

38 Credit Suisse International

39 Daewoo International
(Deutschland) GmbH
40 Daiwa*
41 Danish Energy Agency*

42 Deutsche Bank*
43 Dexia Carbon Capital S.a.r.l
44 ECO Asset Incorporated*

45 E.ON Carbon Sourcing
GmbH††

[Vol. XXIV:1

25

Joint

1

18

0.830% Sole

18

0.5

0.023% Sole

3.5

6

Joint

0.5

0.161% Sole

2

Joint

1.5

0.277% Sole
Joint

6

0.830% Sole

7

Joint

11

2

0.092% Sole

2

7

0.323% Sole

7

10

0.461% Sole

4

Joint

6

23

1.061% Sole

23

3

0.138% Sole

3

21

0.969% Sole

5

Joint

16

18

0.5

0.023% Sole
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Power of Attorney
Holders

46 ECO BANK LTD
47 Eco-Carbone S.A.S††

Number Percentage Type Projects
of
of 2,168
of
Projects Projects Rights
Joint
0.5
1

0.046% Sole

0.5

0.023% Sole
Joint

48 Eco-Frontier Carbon
Partners Limited††
49 ecolutions Trading GmbH††

50 EcoSecurities*

51 Eco-Tec Asia (UK) Ltd.
52 EDF Trading*††

53 Edison Spa
54 Electrabel NV/SA††

63

1

0.5

0.046% Sole
Joint

0.5

1

1

0.023% Sole
Joint

0.5

5.443% Sole

88

Joint

30

6

0.277% Sole

6

72

3.321% Sole

49

Joint

23

10

0.461% Sole

10

18.5

0.853% Sole

3

Joint

15.5

118

55 ELECTRADE S.p.A.

1

0.046% Sole

1

56 Electric Power
Development Co., Ltd.
57 Emissionshandels
Gesellschaft Bavaria Gmbh
58 EnBW Trading GmbH

8

0.369% Sole

8

3

0.138% Sole

3

7

0.323% Sole

6

Joint

1

0.507% Sole

1

59 Endesa*

11
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Power of Attorney
Holders

60 Eneco Energy Trade B.V.††

61 ENEL Trade SpA

62 Energy Systems
International B.V.
63 Equity + Environmental
Assets Ireland Limited
64 Essent Trading*

[Vol. XXIV:1

Number Percentage Type Projects
of
of 2,168
of
Projects Projects Rights
Joint
10
5.5

0.254% Sole

4

Joint

1.5

2.122% Sole

44

Joint

2

1.430% Sole

30

Joint

1

7

0.323% Sole

7

6

0.277% Sole

2

Joint

4

0.092% Sole

1

Joint

1

46

31

65 Europe New Energy
Investment Capital Limited

2

66 First Carbon Fund Ltd

1

0.046% Sole

1

67 First Climate (Switzerland)
AG
68 Gaisi Peony*

2

0.092% Sole

2

2

0.092% Sole

2

69 Gazprom Marketing and
Trading*††

8.5

0.392% Sole

6

Joint

2.5

70 General Energy Capital
Co., Ltd.
71 GETEC Climate Projects
GmbH

4

0.185% Sole

4

6

0.277% Sole

2

Joint

4

72 Goldman Sachs
International

2

0.092% Sole
Joint

2

Anand - Final (Do Not Delete)

Fall 2013]

7/17/2014 10:21 AM

THE U.S., CHINA, AND THE FUTURE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

Power of Attorney
Holders
73 Greenscot Limited
74 GreenStream Network Plc††

Number Percentage Type Projects
of
of 2,168
of
Projects Projects Rights
1
0.046% Sole
1
19.5

0.899% Sole
Shared

75 Grey K Environmental
(Europe) II Ltd.
76 Grütter Consulting AG††

77 Gunvor International B.V.
Amsterdam Geneva
Branch††

65

12
0.5

Joint

7

1

0.046% Sole

1

1.5

0.069% Sole

1

Joint

0.5

0.623% Sole

9

13.5

Shared

0.5

Joint

4
1

78 HANWHA Europe GmbH

1

0.046% Sole

79 Holcim Environment
Services S.A.

4

0.185% Sole

80 ICECAP Carbon Portfolio
Limited
81 ICF - International Clean
Fund*
82 IFC-Netherlands Carbon
Facility (INCaF)
83 ING Bank N.V.
84 Innovative Carbon
Investment Corporation
85 International Bank for
Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD)*
86 International Bank for

Joint

4

1

0.046% Sole

1

4

0.185% Sole

4

1

0.046% Sole
Joint

1

1

0.046% Sole

1

3

0.138% Sole

3

2

0.092% Sole

2

18

0.830% Sole

17
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Power of Attorney
Holders
Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) as
Trustee*
87 International Finance
Corporation as Trustee of
the IFC-Netherlands
Carbon Facility (INCaF)
88 ITOCHU Corporation

[Vol. XXIV:1

Number Percentage Type Projects
of
of 2,168
of
Projects Projects Rights
Joint
1
2

4

0.092% Sole
Joint

2

0.185% Sole

3

Joint

1

89 J.P. Morgan Ventures
Energy Corporation
90 Japan Carbon Finance, Ltd.

3

0.138% Sole

3

6

0.277% Sole

6

91 JGC Corporation

4

0.185% Sole

4

92 J-TEC Co., Ltd.††

4.5

0.208% Sole

93 Kansai Electric Power Co.,
Inc.*
94 KfW*
95 Kommunalkredit Public
Consulting*††

Joint

4.5

0.231% Sole

1

Joint

4

16

0.738% Sole

16

40.5

1.868% Sole

38

Joint

2.5

5

96 Kyushu Electric Power Co.,
INC.

1

0.046% Sole

1

97 Lakewood Carbon Corp.††

5

0.231% Sole

4

Joint

1

0.300% Sole

6

Joint

0.5

98 Luso Carbon Fund*††

6.5
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Power of Attorney
Holders
99 Macquarie Bank Limited

100 Marubeni Corporation

101 Masefield New Energies
AG
102 Mercuria Energy Trading
S.A.

Number Percentage Type Projects
of
of 2,168
of
Projects Projects Rights
20
0.923% Sole
18
Joint

2

1.845% Sole

39

Joint

1

1

0.046% Sole

1

21

0.969% Sole

11

Joint

10

40

103 Merrill Lynch Commodities
(Europe) Limited

6

104 MGM Carbon Portfolio
S.a.r.l.
105 Ministry for Foreign Affairs
of Finland
106 Mitsubishi*

107 Mitsui and Co., Ltd

108 Morgan Stanley and Co.
International plc
109 National Bio Energy Co.,
Ltd.††
110 NATIXIS Environnement
and Infrastructures
111 Natsource*

67

0.277% Sole
Joint

6

37

1.707% Sole

37

1

0.046% Sole

1

56

2.583% Sole

52

Joint

4

0.600% Sole

10

Joint

3

4

0.185% Sole

4

0.5

0.023% Sole

13

Joint

0.5

12

0.554% Sole

12

9

0.415% Sole

8

Joint

1
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Power of Attorney
Holders

Number Percentage Type Projects
of
of 2,168
of
Projects Projects Rights
112 New Energy and Industrial
3
0.138% Sole
3
Technology Development
Organization
113 Nippon Steel Corporation
1
0.046% Sole
Shared
114 NL Agency
115 Noble Carbon Credits

116 Nomura International Plc

117 Nordic Carbon Fund Ky

118 Norwegian Ministry of
Finance

1

1

0.046% Sole

1

38

1.753% Sole

27

Joint

11

0.185% Sole

1

Joint

3

4

1

20

0.046% Sole
Joint

1

0.923% Sole

1

Joint

19

119 Nuon Energy Trade and
Wholesale
120 OneCarbon International
B.V.

1

0.046% Sole

1

9

0.415% Sole

7

Joint

2

121 ORBEO

4

0.185% Sole

3

Joint

1

6

0.277% Sole

6

5

0.231% Sole

4

Joint

1

122 Origin Carbon Management
Limited
123 Originate Carbon*

124 PEAR Carbon Offset

1

0.046% Sole
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Power of Attorney
Holders
Initiative, Ltd.††

69

Number Percentage Type Projects
of
of 2,168
of
Projects Projects Rights
Joint
1

125 Post 2012 Carbon Credit
Fund C.V.††

4

0.185% Sole

1

Joint

3

126 Primary Carbon
International Limited
127 Q.C.A. AG††

1

0.046% Sole

1

4.5

0.208% Sole

4

Joint

0.5

0.231% Sole

2

Joint

3

7

0.323% Sole

7

99

4.566% Sole

74

Joint

25

0.969% Sole

3

Joint

18

1

0.046% Sole

1

10

0.461% Sole

10

134 Smart Energy Co., Ltd.

4

0.185% Sole

4

135 Sojitz Corporation

1

0.046% Sole

1

3.5

0.161% Sole

2

Joint

1.5

7

0.323% Sole

7

4

0.185% Sole

4

8.5

0.392% Sole

8

128 Rabobank International*

129 Renaissance Carbon
Investment Ltd.
130 RWE*

131 Shell Trading International*

132 Showa Shell Sekiyu K.K.
133 Sindicatum Carbon Capital*

136 Solvay Energy Services
SAS††
137 South Pole Carbon Asset
Management Ltd.
138 SSE Energy Supply Ltd.
139 Standard Bank Plc††

5

21
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Power of Attorney
Holders

140 Sumitomo Corporation††

[Vol. XXIV:1

Number Percentage Type Projects
of
of 2,168
of
Projects Projects Rights
Joint
0.5
18.5

0.853% Sole

6

Joint

12.5

141 Swedish Energy Agency*

2

0.092% Sole

2

142 Swiss Carbon Assets Ltd.

2

0.092% Sole

2

143 Tepia Corporation Japan
Co., Ltd.
144 The Chugoku Electric
Power Co., Inc.
145 Tokyo Electric Power*

3

0.138% Sole

3

1

0.046% Sole

1

8

0.369% Sole

3

Joint

5

0.415% Sole

2

Joint

7

146 Total Gas and Power
Limited

9

147 Toyota Tsusho Corporation

2

0.092% Sole

2

148 Trading Emissions*

34

1.568% Sole

34

149 Tricorona Carbon Asset
Management Pte Ltd††

3.5

0.161% Sole

150 Ultimate Carbon Trading
Ltd
151 United Carbon Credits
Limited
152 UPM Umwelt-ProjektManagement GmbH
153 Vattenfall Energy Trading
Netherlands N.V.††
154 Vitol S.A.

Shared

3.5

2

0.092% Sole

2

2

0.092% Sole

2

2

0.092% Sole

2

6

0.277% Sole

5

Joint

1

4.520% Sole

75

98
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Power of Attorney
Holders

71

Number Percentage Type Projects
of
of 2,168
of
Projects Projects Rights
Joint
23

155 Voestalpine AG

4

0.185% Sole

4

156 WCCI World Carbon
Credit Investment Limited
157 Wienerberger AG

2

0.092% Sole

2

1

0.046% Sole

1

158 Zero Emissions
1
0.046% Sole
1
Technologies, S.A.
Total Projects with International
1925
Buyers
* These entities include related entities. For a detailed break-up of each
individual entity’s share, see Table 2 below.
†
The entry Asian Development Bank, as Trustee for the Asia Pacific
Carbon Fund, has been split into two entries, (a) when Asia Pacific
Carbon Fund was the sole buyer, and (b) when two buyers, the Asia
Pacific Carbon Fund and the Future Carbon Fund, were involved, but
both conferred trustee status on the Asian Development Bank.
††
For projects that involved two buyers, rather than one, each buyer’s share
was halved. This explained the fractions in the number of projects. For a
full list of such buyers who together bought a project, see Table 3 below.
TABLE 2: INDIVIDUAL CORPORATE ENTITIES
(COMBINED IN TABLE 1 AND FIGURE 7)
Methodology: As noted in Table 1, the vast majority of projects were
granted “sole” power of attorney. When the powers of attorney granted
were “shared” or “joint,” rows to that effect were included in the Table
below.

1

Arreon
Carbon

Company Name

Number
of
Projects
under
Company

Arreon Carbon
Trading Limited

21

Arreon Carbon
UK Limited

14

Percentage
of Projects

Type of
Rights

Projects

Corporate
Group
(named in
Table 1)

0.969% Sole

11

Joint

10

0.646% Sole

14
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2

Camco

Company Name

Arreon Carbon
UK Ltd.
Camco Carbon
Credits Limited
Camco Carbon
Limited

3

Carbon
Asset
Manage
ment

Carbon
Capital
Manage
ment

Percentage
of Projects

Type of
Rights

18

0.830% Sole

18

12

0.554% Sole

6

Joint

6

1.476% Sole

17

Joint

15.5

0.277% Sole

6

Joint

.5

32.5

Camco
International
Limited

6.5

Camco
International
Ltd.
Carbon Asset
Management
Sweden AB

1

0.046% Sole

1

124

5.720% Sole

121

Carbon Asset
Management
Sweden Pte Ltd.
4

Number
of
Projects
under
Company

Projects

Corporate
Group
(named in
Table 1)

[Vol. XXIV:1

Carbon Capital
Management
(Japan)
Carbon Capital
Management,
Inc.

Carbon Capital
Management,
Inc. (Japan)

24.5

Shared

2

Joint

1

1.130% Sole

23

Shared

1.5

1

0.046% Sole

1

9.5

0.438% Sole

5

Shared

5.5

0.5

Joint

4

0.254% Sole

1

Shared
Joint

1
3.5
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Corporate
Group
(named in
Table 1)

Company Name

Carbon
Resource
Manage
ment

Carbon
Resource
Management
Ltd.
Carbon
Resource
Management
S.A.
Cargill
International
S.A.
Green Hercules
Trading Limited
Green Hercules
Trading Limited
(A Cargill
Company)
Climate Change
Capital Carbon
Fund II s.á r.l
Climate Change
Capital Carbon
Managed
Account Limited
Climate Change
Capital China
Limited
ConocoPhillips
(U.K.) Ltd.

Cargill
Internati
onal

Climate
Change
Capital

ConocoP
hillips
(U.K.

Daiwa

Number
of
Projects
under
Company

8

Percentage
of Projects

Type of
Rights

73

Projects

5

7/17/2014 10:21 AM

0.369% Sole

7

Joint

1

5.443% Sole

76

Joint

42

10

0.461% Sole

10

18

0.830% Sole

18

1

0.046% Sole

1

23

1.061% Sole

23

1

0.046% Sole

1

1

0.046% Sole

1

2

0.092% Sole

118

Joint

ConocoPhillips
(U.K.) Limited

4

Daiwa PI
Partners Co. Ltd.
Daiwa Securities
SMBC Co. Ltd.

2

0.185% Sole
Joint

4

4

0.185% Sole

4

2

0.092% Sole

2
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11

Danish
Energy
Agency

Deutsche
Bank

12

ECO
Asset
Incorpor
ated

13

EcoSecur
ities

Company Name

Number
of
Projects
under
Company

Percentage
of Projects

[Vol. XXIV:1

Type of
Rights

Projects

Corporate
Group
(named in
Table 1)

10

7/17/2014 10:21 AM

Daiwa Securities
SMBC Principal
Investments Co.,
Ltd.
Danish Ministry
of Climate and
Energy, Danish
Energy Agency
The Danish
Energy Agency

1

0.046% Sole

1

4

0.185% Sole

4

6

0.277% Sole

Deutsche Bank
AG
Deutsche Bank
AG (Filiale
London)
Deutsche Bank
AG, London
Branch
ECO Asset
Incorporated
was combined
with Eco Asset
Incorporated
EcoSecurities
Carbon 1 Ltd.
EcoSecurities
Group Limited
EcoSecurities
Group Plc
EcoSecurities
International
Limited
EcoSecurities
International Ltd

Joint

6

5

0.231% Sole

5

5

0.231% Sole

5

13

0.600% Sole

13

5

0.231% Sole

5

1

0.046% Sole

1

70

3.229% Sole

48

Joint

22

1.384% Sole

25

Joint

5

0.046% Sole

1

30

1
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15

EDF
Trading

Endesa

16

ENEL
Trade
SpA

17

Essent
Trading

18

19

Gaisi
Peony

Gazprom
Marketin
g and
Trading

Company Name

Number
of
Projects
under
Company

EcoSecurities
Ltd.

11

EDF Trading
Limited

62.5

EDF Trading
Ltd

9.5

Endesa Carbono
S.L.

4

Endesa
Generación S.A.

7

ENEL Trade
SpA was
combined with
Enel Trade SpA
Essent Energy
Trading B.V.

2

Percentage
of Projects

Type of
Rights

75

Projects

Corporate
Group
(named in
Table 1)

14

7/17/2014 10:21 AM

0.507% Sole

8

Joint

3

2.883% Sole

49

Joint

23.5

0.438% Sole

5

Joint

4.5

0.185% Sole

0

Joint

4

0.323% Sole

1

Joint

6

0.092% Sole

1

Joint

1

0.185% Sole

1

Joint

3

Essent Trading
International
S.A.

4

Gaisi Peony
Capital s.a.r.l
Gaisi Peony
Carbon Capital
s.a.r.l
Gazprom
Marketing and
Trading Limited

1

0.046% Sole

1

1

0.046% Sole

1

1.5

0.069% Sole

1

Joint

0.5

0.092% Sole

2

Gazprom
Marketing and

2
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Company Name

Number
of
Projects
under
Company

Percentage
of Projects

Type of
Rights

Projects

Corporate
Group
(named in
Table 1)

[Vol. XXIV:1

Trading Ltd.

20

21

22

ICF Internati
onal
Clean
Fund

Internati
onal
Bank for
Reconstr
uction
and
Develop
ment
(IBRD)

Internati
onal
Bank for
Reconstr
uction
and
Develop
ment

Gazprom
Marketing and
Trading
Singapore Pte.
Ltd.
ICF International
Clean Fund LLC
ICF International
Clean Fund LLC
Lewes,
Mendrisio
Branch
International
Bank for
Reconstruction
and
Development
(IBRD)
International
Bank for
Reconstruction
and
Development
(IBRD) (the
Netherlands,
Italy and other
Parties)
IBRD as Trustee
of the
BioCarbon Fund
IBRD as Trustee
of the Italian
Carbon Fund
International
Bank for

5

0.231% Sole

3

Joint

2

2

0.092% Sole

2

2

0.092% Sole

2

1

0.046% Sole

1

1

0.046% Sole

1

1

0.046% Sole

1

1

0.046% Sole

1

2

0.092% Sole

2
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(IBRD)
as
Trustee

Company Name

Reconstruction
and
Development
(IBRD) as
Trustee for the
Danish Carbon
Fund
International
Bank for
Reconstruction
and
Development
(IBRD) as
Trustee of the
Carbon Funds
International
Bank for
Reconstruction
and
Development
(IBRD) as
Trustee of the
Community
Development
Carbon Fund
(CDCF)
International
Bank for
Reconstruction
and
Development
(IBRD) as
Trustee of the
Netherlands
CDM Facility
(NCDMF)
International
Bank for
Reconstruction

Number
of
Projects
under
Company

Percentage
of Projects

Type of
Rights

Projects

Corporate
Group
(named in
Table 1)

77

1

0.046% Sole

1

4

0.185% Sole

4

1

0.046% Sole

1

1

0.046% Sole

1
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Company Name

and
Development
(IBRD) as
Trustee of the
Prototype
Carbon Fund
(PCF)
International
Bank for
Reconstruction
and
Development
(IBRD) as
Trustee of the
Spanish Carbon
Fund (SCF)
International
Bank for
Reconstruction
and
Development as
Trustee of the
First Tranche of
the Umbrella
Carbon Facility
International
Bank for
Reconstruction
and
Development as
Trustee of the
Italian Carbon
Fund
International
Bank for
Reconstruction
and
Development as
Trustee of the

Number
of
Projects
under
Company

Percentage
of Projects

Type of
Rights

Projects

Corporate
Group
(named in
Table 1)

[Vol. XXIV:1

3

0.138% Sole

3

1

0.046% Sole

1

1

0.046% Sole

1

1

0.046% Sole
Joint

1
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Company Name

PCF and
NCDMF
The
International
Bank for
Reconstruction
and
Development
(IBRD) as
Trustee of the
BioCarbon Fund
23

24

KfW

Kommun
alkredit
Public
Consulti
ng

25

Lakewoo
d Carbon
Corp.

26

Luso
Carbon
Fund

KfW
KfW
Bankengruppe
Kommunalkredit
Public
Consulting
Kommunalkredit
Public
Consulting
GmbH
Lakewood
Carbon Corp.
was combined
with
LAKEWOOD
CARBON
CORP.
Luso Carbon
Fund
Luso Carbon
Fund – Fundo
Especial de
Investimento
Fechado

Number
of
Projects
under
Company

Percentage
of Projects

Type of
Rights

Projects

Corporate
Group
(named in
Table 1)

79

1

0.046% Sole

1

13

0.600% Sole

13

3

0.138% Sole

3

1

0.046% Sole

1

39.5

1.822% Sole

37

Joint

2.5

0.254% Sole

4.5

Joint

1

0.046% Sole

1

5.5

1
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Mitsubis
hi

28

NATIXI
S
Environn
ement
and
Infrastru
ctures

29

Natsourc
e

30

Noble
Carbon
Credits

Company Name

Mitsubishi
Corporation

Number
of
Projects
under
Company

52

Mitsubishi
Heavy
Industries, Ltd.

1

Mitsubishi UFJ
Morgan Stanley
Securities Co.,
Ltd.
Mitsubishi UFJ
Securities Co.,
Ltd.
NATIXIS
Environnement
and
Infrastructures
was combined
with Natixis
Environnement
and
Infrastructures
Natsource Asset
Management
Corp.
Natsource Asset
Management
Corporation
Natsource
Europe Limited
Natsource
Europe Ltd.
Noble Carbon
Credits Limit
Noble Carbon

Percentage
of Projects

[Vol. XXIV:1

Type of
Rights

Projects

Corporate
Group
(named in
Table 1)

27
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2.399% Sole

49

Joint

3

0.046% Sole
Joint

1

2

0.092% Sole

2

1

0.046% Sole

1

3

0.138% Sole

2

Joint

1

3

0.138% Sole

3

2

0.092% Sole

2

1

0.046% Sole

1

1

0.046% Sole

34

Joint

1

1.568% Sole

25
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Company Name

Number
of
Projects
under
Company

Credits Limited
Noble Carbon
Credits Ltd.
31

ORBEO

32

Originate
Carbon

33

34

Raboban
k
Internati
onal

RWE

ORBEO was
combined with
Orbeo
Originate
Carbon Limited
Originate
Carbon Ltd.
Cooperatieve
Centrale
Raiffeisen
Boerenleenbank
B.A. (trading as)
Rabobank
International
London Branch
Rabobank
International

Type of
Rights

Joint

9

0.138% Sole

2

Joint

1

2

0.092% Sole

2

3

0.138% Sole

2

Joint

1

1

0.046% Sole

1

3

0.138% Sole

1

Joint

2

3

Rabobank
International,
London Branch

1

RWE Power AG

43

RWE Power
Aktiengesellscha
ft
RWE Supply
and Trading
Netherlands
B.V.

Percentage
of Projects

Projects

Corporate
Group
(named in
Table 1)

81

0.046% Sole
Joint

1

1.983% Sole

41

Joint

2

6

0.277% Sole

6

6

0.277% Sole

6
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36

37

Shell
Trading
Internati
onal

Sindicatu
m
Carbon
Capital

Swedish
Energy
Agency

Company Name

Number
of
Projects
under
Company

RWE Supply
and Trading
Switzerland S.A.

44

Shell Trading
International
Limited

11

Shell Trading
International
Limited (UK)

2

Shell Trading
International
Ltd.

7

Shell Trading
International
Ltd.(UK)

1

Sindicatum
Carbon Capital
(Cayman)
Limited
Sindicatum
Carbon Capital
(China) Ltd.
Sindicatum
Carbon Capital
Ltd.
Government of
Sweden Swedish Energy
Agency
Swedish CDM
and JI
Programme
International
Climate Policy
Section Swedish
Energy Agency

Percentage
of Projects

[Vol. XXIV:1

Type of
Rights

Projects

Corporate
Group
(named in
Table 1)

35
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2.030% Sole

21

Joint

23

0.507% Sole

3

Joint

8

0.092% Sole
Joint

2

0.323% Sole
Joint

7

0.046% Sole
Joint

1

3

0.138% Sole

3

1

0.046% Sole

1

6

0.277% Sole

6

1

0.046% Sole

1

1

0.046% Sole

1
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Tokyo
Electric
Power

39

Total
Gas and
Power
Limited

40

Trading
Emission
s

Company Name

Number
of
Projects
under
Company

The Tokyo
Electric Power
Co., Inc.

3

The Tokyo
Electric Power
Company, Inc.

2

The Tokyo
Electric Power
Company,
Incorporated
Tokyo Electric
Power Co.
Total Gas and
Power Limited
was combined
with TOTAL
Gas and Power
Limited
Trading
Emissions
Limited
Trading
Emissions PLC

2

Percentage
of Projects

Type of
Rights

83

Projects

Corporate
Group
(named in
Table 1)

38
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0.138% Sole

1

Joint

2

0.092% Sole

1

Joint

1

0.092% Sole
Joint

2

1

0.046% Sole

1

1

0.046% Sole

1

33

1.522% Sole

33

TABLE 3 – LIST OF PROJECTS INVOLVING TWO BUYERS
1

2

Buyer 1
Asian Development
Bank, as trustee of
the Future Carbon
Fund
Asian Development
Bank, as trustee of
the Future Carbon
Fund

Buyer 2
Asian Development
Bank, as trustee of the
Asia Pacific Carbon
Fund
Asian Development
Bank, as trustee of the
Asia Pacific Carbon
Fund

Project Name
Heqing Solar
Cooker Project
II
Heqing Solar
Cooker Project I
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Buyer 1
Eco-Frontier Carbon
Partners Limited

Buyer 2
Carbon Capital
Management, Inc.

4

Gunvor International
B.V. Amsterdam
Geneva Branch

Carbon Capital
Management, Inc.

5

Gunvor International
B.V. Amsterdam
Geneva Branch
Gunvor International
B.V. Amsterdam
Geneva Branch

Carbon Capital
Management, Inc.

7

Solvay Energy
Services SAS

CCAN Consulting
GmbH

8

Kommunalkredit
Public Consulting
GmbH (“KPC”)

China Carbon N.V.

9

Post 2012 Carbon
Credit Fund CV

Climate Change
Investment II S.A.
SICAR

3

6

Carbon Capital
Management, Inc.
(Japan)

[Vol. XXIV:1

Project Name
Fujian Cement
4# and 5# kilns
Waste Heat
Recovery for
Power
Generation
Project
Hunan Waste
Gas Based
Power Project in
Liangang Group
Yunnan Sayutuo
60MW Hydro
Power Project
Gansu Wuwei
23MW Zamusi
Hydropower
Project
Shuangpai
County
Yongjiang
Cascade
Hydropower
Project, Hunan,
P.R. China
Sichuan
provincial
Longchi and
Caoyuan 9 MW
Small-scale
Hydro Power
Bundle Project
Shenmu County
Jieneng
Multipurpose
Use Power Co.
Ltd. 100MW
Semi-coke
Waste Gas for
Power
Generation
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Buyer 1

Buyer 2

Project Name
Project

10

GreenStream
Network Plc

Climate Opportunity
Fund Ky

11

PEAR Carbon Offset
Initiative, Ltd.

E.ON Carbon
Sourcing GmbH

12

EDF Trading Ltd.

Eco-Carbone S.A.S

13

Carbon Capital
Management, Inc.

Eco-Frontier Carbon
Partners Limited

14

Gazprom Marketing
and Trading Limited

ecolutions Trading
GmbH

15

Standard Bank Plc

Electrabel NV/SA

16

China Carbon N.V.

Eneco Energy Trade
B.V.

17

Carbon Capital
Management, Inc.

Gunvor International
B.V. Amsterdam
Geneva Branch

Sichuan
Fangdaping
Hydropower
Project
Sichuan
Guang’an
Caishandong
Coal Mine
CMM Power
Generation
Project
Yangquan
Nanmei (Group)
Co., Ltd.
Coalmine
Methane
Utilization
Project
Wuda
Wuhushan Coal
Mine Methane
Power
Generation
Project
Hunan Daxing
Small
Hydropower
Project
Hainan Gezhen
Hydropower
Project
Shaanxi Shenmu
Hengdong
Waste Gas
Based Electricity
Generation
Project
Shaanxi
Provincial Yang
County Kafang

85
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Buyer 1

Buyer 2

18

Carbon Capital
Management, Inc.
(Japan)

Gunvor International
B.V. Amsterdam
Geneva Branch

19

Carbon Capital
Management, Inc.

Gunvor International
B.V. Amsterdam,
Geneva Branch

20

Carbon Capital
Management,
Inc.(Japan)

Gunvor International
B.V. Amsterdam,
Geneva Branch

21

Carbon Capital
Management, Inc.

Gunvor International
B.V. Amsterdam,
Geneva Branch

22

Sumitomo
Corporation

J-TEC Co., Ltd.

23

Grütter Consulting

Luso Carbon Fund

[Vol. XXIV:1

Project Name
12 MW Smallscale Hydro
Power Project
15MW Waste
Heat Recovery
and Power
Generation
Project in
Jiangsu Helin
Cement Co.,
Ltd.
Jiexiu City
Guotai Green
Energy Co., Ltd
Biomass Power
Generation
Project in
Shanxi Province
Waste Heat
Recovery and
Power
Generation
Project in Jilin
Yatai Group
Mingcheng
Cement Co.,
Ltd.
Waste Heat
Recovery and
Power
Generation
Project in Yatai
Group Harbin
Cement Co.,
Ltd.
Xiamen Eastern
Municipal Solid
Waste
Incineration
Project
BRT
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Buyer 1
AG

Buyer 2

24

EDF Trading Limited

National Bio Energy
Co., Ltd.

25

Gunvor International
B.V. Amsterdam
Geneva Branch

PEAR Carbon Offset
Initiative, ltd.

26

Climate Change
Investment II
S.A.SICAR

Post 2012 Carbon
Credit Fund C.V.

27

Climate Protection
Invest AG

Q.C.A. AG

28

Lakewood Carbon
Corp.

Solvay Energy
Services SAS

29

Lakewood Carbon
Corp.

Solvay Energy
Services SAS

30

Carbon Asset
Management Sweden
AB

Tricorona Carbon
Asset Management Pte
Ltd

31

Carbon Asset
Management Sweden

Tricorona Carbon
Asset Management Pte

Project Name
Zhengzhou,
China
Xinjiang Awati
Biomass Power
Generation
Project
Sichuan Carbide
Calcium
Residues Based
Cement Plant
Project in
Leshan City
Gansu
Longwangtai
Hydropower
Project
Lintan
Qingshishan
Hydropower
Station
Expansion
Project
Methane
Recovery
Project of Jilin
Province
Xintianlong
Alcohol Co.,
Ltd.
Methane
Recovery
Project of
Meihekou City
Fukang Alcohol
Co., Ltd.
Guizhou
Qingshuitang
9MW Hydro
Project
Liangshan
Chunheweishui
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Buyer 1
AB

Buyer 2
Ltd
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Project Name
Small
Hydropower
Project
32 Carbon Asset
Tricorona Carbon
Qijiaping
Management Sweden Asset Management Pte Hydropower
AB.
Ltd.
Project in Gansu
Province
33 Carbon Asset
Tricorona Carbon
Huadian Ningxia
Management Sweden Asset Management
Ningdong
Pte Ltd
Pte. Ltd
Yangjiayao
Wind Farm
Expansion
Project
34 Carbon Asset
Tricorona Carbon
Huadian Ningxia
Management Sweden Asset Management
Ningdong
Pte Ltd
Pte. Ltd
10MWp Solar
PV Power
Station Project
35 Carbon Asset
Tricorona Carbon
Huadian Ningxia
Management Sweden Asset Management
Ningdong
Pte Ltd
Pte. Ltd
Yangjiayao
Phase III Wind
Farm Project
36 Carbon Asset
Tricorona Carbon
Musa River 1st
Management Sweden Asset Management
Level Small
AB
Pte. Ltd.
Hydropower
Project
37 China Carbon N.V.*
Vattenfall Energy
Sichuan Tiejue
Trading Netherlands
25MW Hydro
N.V.
Power Project
38 China Carbon N.V.*
Vattenfall Energy
Longyou 18
Trading Netherlands
MW
N.V.
Hydropower
Project in
Zhejiang
Province
* Corrected from “China Carbon N.V.” in the original Modalities of
Communication.

